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INTRODUCTION
In a society perpetually altered by human innovation, we are faced
with the elementary problem of keeping the law apace with
technology.  In particular, the explosion of video surveillance and
micro-camera technology1 has had a profound impact upon our
concept of privacy.2  As video surveillance equipment has become
smaller, more portable, more easily concealed, and more accessible
to the general public,3 its pervasive application has contributed to
today’s cultural fascination with voyeurism.4
                                                                
1. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance:
The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 405
(1997) (suggesting that the past three decades have seen dramatic advances in the
field of video technology “permitting covert observation in virtually any
circumstance”); Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You’re On Candid Camera:
Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997) (“Video
surveillance technology was first introduced in 1956, but never has the intrusion
been so pervasive as today.”) (citation omitted).
2. See generally Eric Brazil, Hidden Cameras Raise Concerns As Use For Video
Surveillance Grows, So Do Privacy Worries, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 7, 1999, at A1 (reporting
that surveillance and security cameras have become so prevalent that no one knows
how many are out there, but noting estimates of about two million cameras in the
United States).  The article also states that, “in Manhattan alone more than 2,400
cameras record the behavior of people in public places.”  Id.  See also Stacy Downs et
al., Hidden Cameras Focus On Privacy:  Think You Can’t Be Seen?, SAN D IEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 14, 1998, at E4 (quoting a New York city traffic controller, discussing the
prevalence of surveillance cameras, as stating “[i]f you can see the Empire State
Building, we can see you”).
3. See, e.g., Hidden Camera Solutions (visited Feb. 10, 2000)
<http://www.concealedcameras.com/catalogue/cameras.html> (advertising a
lipstick camera for $199.00, a ceiling speaker camera for $229.00, and a pager
camera for $199.00); Spy Stuff (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.spystuff.com/
videocam.html> (selling a “spy pinhole video camera” for $89.95); Big Brother
Surveillance (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.bigbrothersurveillance.net/
wireless.htm> (selling a wireless clock radio camera for $375, a wireless stuffed
animal camera for $475, and a wireless coffee maker camera for $525).  See also CBS
This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 1, 1999) (reporting on availability of
hidden camera products).
4. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 305 (1999) (describing the proliferation of voyeur
based media within American society, and further analyzing voyeurism as an
emerging form of expression possibly falling under the First Amendment); Doug
Bedell, It’s a Webcam World; Prevalence of The Internet Live Shot Raises Privacy Issues, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Aug. 9, 1999, at 53 (reporting that the integration of
surveillance technology and the Internet has enabled webcams to provide untold
audiences with live access to the probing eyes of cameras); Lisa de Moraes, CBS
Drowns Out Competition, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2000, at C7 (reporting that the final
episode of CBS’ voyeur-based television show “Survivor,” garnered 51 million
viewers).  In the Bedell article, the author notes that “[w]ith today’s cheap, tiny,
video cameras and the connectivity of the Internet, it is possible that someone—or
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Throughout the country, newspaper headlines report unsavory
stories of surreptitiously concealed video cameras prying into
bedrooms,5 bathrooms,6 locker rooms,7 changing rooms,8 and tanning
booths9 in prurient attempts to film unsuspecting victims while in
                                                                
everyone—may be watching at moments you consider private.”  Bedell, supra, at 53.
See also Paul Brownfield, Are We ‘Truman’ Television:  Reality-Based Shows That Allow
Viewers Into People’s Personal Lives Are Raising Questions About the Increasingly Invasive
Nature Of The Media, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at F1 (suggesting that reality-based
television shows, such as Fox’s “Cops,” MTV’s “The Real World,” and HBO’s “Taxicab
Confessions,” have blurred the distinction between the public and private realm and
have turned T.V. viewers into voyeurs); Vinay Menon, Peekaboo Culture, TORONTO
STAR, Aug. 22, 1999 (disclosing several pertinent examples of modern voyeuristic
culture, such as “Voyeur Dorm,” a web site that provides paying members access over
the Internet to an inside view of a college female group house in Tampa, Florida);
Voyeurdorm.com, Guests Tour (visited Oct. 7, 2000) <http://www.voyeurdorm.com>
[hereinafter Voyeurdorm] (showcasing the Internet as a medium of modern age
voyeurism).
The website boasts:
We are sexy young college girls ages 18-22 choosing to live our lives on
camera 24 hours a day 7 days a week.  You can watch us from hidden
cameras located in each room of our house.  See us slumber in our beds,
sneak a peak at us in the bathroom or shower, gaze at us lounging by the
pool, and get to know us in our chat room.
Voyeurdorm, supra.  The Menon article further notes the tremendous growth of
reality-based television programming in the United States, from 11 shows in March of
1997 to 118 shows in March of 1998.  See Menon, supra; see also Nora Zamichow, Spies’
Eyes and Ears Go Public, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at A1 (reporting that modern
surveillance and spy technology, once limited to the military, is now readily available
to the public, and that business is booming).  Zamichow notes that “[s]urveillance
cameras have become so prevalent in public places that billboards advertising
fashions by Kenneth Cole caution:  ‘You are on a video camera an average of 10
times a day.  Are you dressed for it?’”  Id.
5. See J. Scott Orr, Videotape Voyeurs Find Legal Loopholes:  Hidden-Camera Laws Next
to Nonexistent, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), May 17, 1999, at 1 (reporting that a young
woman discovered a camera no larger than a cigarette pack concealed in her
apartment).
6. See, e.g., Andrea Siegel, Secret Tape of Woman in Bathroom Recorded; After Shower,
Camera Found; Man Charged with Wiretap Violation, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 13, 1999, at
1B (reporting that an individual who tiles bathrooms for a living secretly installed a
hidden video camera inside the shower of a longtime family friend); Hidden Cameras
in Park Showers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A23 (reporting on the discovery of at
least two hidden cameras installed in public showers at Yosemite National Park,
apparently intended to film nude images of campers as they showered).
7. See, e.g., Linda Massarella, Nude Jocks Steamed Over Raw Footage, N.Y. POST, Aug.
10, 1999, at 17 (stating that over 250 male college athletes nationwide have reported
being videotaped by hidden cameras while undressing, urinating, or showering in
their locker rooms, and that these tapes are being sold on gay pornography Internet
sites); Around the State:  The Week in Brief, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 10, 1999, at 6 (reporting
that a middle school physical education intern recently was charged with
misdemeanor voyeurism for surreptitiously videotaping sixth-grade female students
in their locker room).
8. See, e.g., Davis Official Charged With Voyeurism, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 6, 1999, at
B2 (reporting that a medical director of an area hospital misrepresented himself as a
photographer for a modeling agency, invited several women to his home-studio to
pose, and secretly recorded the women as they changed clothing in what they
believed to be a private room).
9. See, e.g., Tony Rizzo, Taping in Secret Leads to Jail Term:  Hidden Cameras at
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various states of undress.  Consider, however, the voyeur who intends
to perpetrate these privacy intrusions specifically within the public
space.10  The following excerpt of a letter written to California State
Assemblyman Dick Ackerman shockingly illustrates both this newest
trend in video voyeurism11 and this fundamental challenge to
individual privacy:
[T]he Montclair Police Department has experienced an increase in
incidents involving subject’s video taping the private parts of
seemingly unwilling females in public places . . . . One example of
this type of incident was brought to the Montclair Police
Department’s attention on 8-28-98.  The Plaza security observed via
the video surveillance system a subject carrying a shopping bag,
riding the escalator up and down on several occasions.  As the
security observed the subject, they noticed he was entering the
escalator to ride up to the second story behind women wearing
skirts.  The subject placed a shopping bag on the step below the
female wearing a skirt, and would ride up the escalator until it
reached the top floor.  The subject would then ride down the
escalator and wait until another female wearing a skirt would enter
again.  After observing the subject doing this on several occasions,
the Plaza security contacted the subject and found that he had an
8mm video camera hidden in a shoebox within the shopping bag.
The subject admitted to video taping the women wearing skirts in
order to sell the videotape to an Internet website.12
Although video voyeurism may appear ridiculous or even silly at
first glance,13 it is, in fact, a very invasive and intimidating crime.14
                                                                
Tanning Salon Recorded Patrons, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 13, 1999, at B1 (reporting that at
least 58 women in Kansas City, Kansas, were secretly videotaped through “an
elaborate set-up of cameras and fake vents” as they undressed for their tanning
sessions).  The defendant was sentenced to 12 months in the county jail after
pleading guilty to 15 misdemeanor counts of eavesdropping.  See id.
10. The public space, as it is commonly understood, means any broad range of
areas that are regularly open and accessible to the public, such as a public street, a
shopping mall, a restaurant dining room, or an open field.  See generally BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a public place as being “more public than
private” and usually accessible to the public).
11. For the purposes of this Comment, video voyeurism is defined generally as
the use of any instrument or image-recording device for the non-consensual and
surreptitious observation and/or preservation of the image of another person’s
naked body or intimate body parts or undergarments, with the intent to invade that
other person’s privacy.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1578 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
voyeurism as a condition where an individual derives sexual satisfaction from secretly
observing sexual organs or acts of others); see also supra notes 5-9 and accompanying
text (citing examples of video voyeurism).
12. Letter from Matthew Eaton, Sex Crime Investigator, City of Montclair,
California, to Assemblyman Dick Ackerman, California State Assembly (June 7, 1999)
[hereinafter Letter from Matthew Eaton] (on file with author) (expressing strong
support for pending video voyeurism bill).
13. See John Auerbach, We’re Being Watched:  Parents Point to Peeping Tom Suspect,
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The “subject” whom this letter describes, surreptitiously invaded the
privacy of eighteen different individuals during this single
incident15—many of whom may have unwittingly become the object
of any number of “up-skirt” Internet pornography sites.16  More
distressing, though, is the unpalatable truth that this man, and many
others like him, could not be arrested and convicted under criminal
law.17
Although several states have passed statutes prohibiting certain
forms of surreptitious videotaping,18 peculiarly, it is the very audacity
of perpetrating these wrongs in a public setting that provides the
                                                                
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1995, at 1 (stating that many criminologists and law
enforcement officials do not consider Peeping Toms as major offenders).  This
Comment will demonstrate, however, that video voyeurism yields a far greater
intrusion of privacy than that committed by the simple window-peeper.  See infra
discussion Part III and Part IV (citing examples of video voyeurism and its traumatic
effect on its victims and society).
14. See discussion infra Parts III, IV (demonstrating the invasive nature and
negative impact of video voyeurism).
15. See Letter from Matthew Eaton, supra note 12 (describing the subject’s
actions that led to the invasion of privacy).
16. See, e.g., Voyeur Lounge, Tour (visited Oct. 7, 2000) <http://www.voyeurlounge.
com> (promoting “The Best Live Voyeur Action on the Net” and advertising a host of
hidden camera videos including upskirt cams); Goosebump Videos, Candid Upskirts
Videos (visited Sept. 11, 1999) <http://www.bulletron.com/goosebump/secure.htm>
(advertising the sale of “upskirt” videos, all recorded surreptitiously within the public
space, for as little as $39); Skip’s Voyeur Site (visited Sept. 11, 1999)
<http://www.kandid-pics.com> (boasting that “[y]ou’re not supposed to look up
girls skirts, but we encourage it”); Upskirt Voyeur:  A Pervert’s Paradise (visited Sept. 11,
1999) <http://www.upskirt-voyeur.com> (boasting over 300 “upskirt” and other
voyeuristic pictures).  See also Janice D’Arcy, Video Voyeurs Expose Flaws In Laws:
Prosecutors Across U.S. Find They Need New Stricter Legislation To Protect Privacy,
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 4, 1998, at A1, in which the author quotes Beth Givens,
director of a California based non-profit privacy organization, as saying, “[i]t’s
becoming a part of young male culture—sort of like hacking used to be.  The videos
have become something akin to a trophy.”  It should be noted that due to the
transitional nature of the Internet, specific web sites tend to come and go; however,
voyeuristic and non-consensual pornographic material on the Internet is likely to
have a continual presence. See Symposium, Policing Obscenity and Pornography in an
Online World, 8 WM . & MARY BILL RTS. J. 693, 699 (2000) (reporting that the total
revenue generated by adult content Internet sites is approaching one billion dollars).
One panelist stated, “[p]ornography, unfortunately, is blindly easy to encounter on
the Internet.”  Id.
17. See Letter from Matthew Eaton, supra note 12 (stating the district attorney’s
rejection of the case due to a lack of appropriate law).  The letter continues:
[T]he subject was arrested, however, when the case was presented to the
District Attorney it was rejected, due to the fact there was no specific law
which covered this incident.  At the behest of the Plaza security details,
research was conducted and a dialogue established with the District
Attorney’s office.  Unfortunately, the vast majority of the incidents resulted
in rejections for any criminal charges and none for what was investigated as
lewd conduct.  State law just did not specifically cover this conduct.
Id.
18. See discussion infra Part III (surveying several state statutes criminalizing
certain acts of video voyeurism).
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video voyeur with certain refuge from criminal prosecution.19  Simply
stated, the problem is that neither criminal nor civil law
acknowledges an individual’s expectation of privacy in public places
as reasonable.20  Therefore, society is simply ill-prepared to combat
fully the new-technology crime of video voyeurism.21  This Comment
argues that criminal law must break free from fallacious distinctions
between public and private space and must specifically recognize an
individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the public space.22
Part I re-introduces the original right of privacy as envisioned by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis23 and advocates an enriched and
more responsive understanding of legal privacy as it relates
specifically to video voyeurism.  Part II surveys the role of criminal law
in the history of privacy protection, and argues for an expansion of
such protection due to the current inadequacy of both criminal and
civil remedies.  Part III expands this criticism of contemporary
criminal protection of privacy and reveals, by detailed reference to
recent video voyeurism statutes, a fundamental deficiency in the
majority of jurisdictions’ criminal prohibition of video voyeurism.
Part IV discusses two model video voyeurism statutes that
demonstrate an enhanced understanding of privacy within the
modern age.  Finally, this Comment concludes that criminal law must
continue to “re-think” privacy by rejecting formalistic distinctions
regarding space and must prohibit patently unreasonable invasions of
privacy wherever they occur.
I. A FRESH LOOK AT AN ANCIENT RIGHT:  INVIOLATE PERSONALITY
AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Origin of Legal Privacy
Throughout history, human beings have always recognized a
concept of privacy.24  Nevertheless, what is meant by privacy continues
                                                                
19. See discussion infra Parts II.C and III.D (discussing the failure of both the civil
and the criminal law to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public
space).
20. See discussion infra Parts II.C and III.D.
21. See D’Arcy, supra note 16, at A1 (“[T]he law has lagged behind.  Over and
over, prosecutors nationwide have been forced to cobble together existing laws—
and, sometimes, seemingly unrelated ones—if they wish to pursue a criminal case.”).
22. See discussion infra Part II (surveying the historical role of the criminal law
and arguing for an expansion that would protect privacy in public places).
23. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (articulating, for the first time, the concept of legal privacy).
24. See DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 3, 9 (1995) (“Anthropological
and historical evidence . . . is sufficient to indicate that a demand for various kinds of
privacy and an intuitive understanding of them are built into human beings.”).
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to defy a singular and precise definition,25 beyond that of the
oversimplified, yet often quoted “right to be let alone.”26  It was not
until 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis drafted the
blueprints for a new tort,27 that privacy first gained credibility as an
interest entitled to legal protection.28
Although a detailed history of the legal right of privacy is beyond
the scope of this Comment,29 it is critical to understand that Warren
                                                                
25. See COLIN BENNETT & REBECCA GRANT, VISIONS OF PRIVACY:  POLICY CHOICES
FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 5 (1996) (stating that “privacy is a deeply and essentially
contested concept”); PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY xiii (1995) (“In virtually
all philosophical and legal writing about privacy, authors begin by noting the
difficulty in conceptualizing their subject.”); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of
Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (identifying five dominant species of legal
privacy:  tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy,
fundamental-decision privacy, and state constitutional privacy); see also MCLEAN,
supra note 24, at 3 (stating that privacy will remain an elusive concept, similar to both
liberty and freedom, because privacy is employed as a loose political term and is
defined in part by subjective values).  McLean states that “[t]he ability of most people
to articulate the nature of privacy has not caught up with their intuitive
understanding that it is important.  In fact, language itself is not yet adequate to the
task of communicating clearly about privacy.”  Id. at 5.
26. See COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888) (addressing the “right to be let alone” as
a subject of tort law); cf. George Trubow, The Development and Status of “Informational
Privacy” Law and Policy in the United States in Symp., Invited Papers on Privacy:  Law,
Ethics and Technology (Oct. 4-7, 1981) at 2 (discussing usage of the phrase “the right to
be let alone” and its broad applicability to several interests).  Trubow notes that:
Unfortunately that phrase [the “right to be let alone”] has been repeatedly
used to describe privacy, but it does not precisely define the concept.  Being
let alone can also describe the interest violated by such torts as assault,
battery, false imprisonment and trespass to property, which were really the
context for Cooley’s use of the phrase.
Id.
27. Along with crafting a tort remedy, Warren and Brandeis also suggested that
the criminal law should be employed to protect the right to privacy.  See Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 23, at 219.  In making this point, Warren and Brandeis
concluded that “[i]t would doubtless be desirable that the privacy of the individual
should receive the added protection of the criminal law . . . .”  Id.  See also William
Beaney, The Right To Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 257
(1966) (“To protect man’s ‘inviolate personality’ against the intrusive behavior so
increasingly evident in their time, Warren and Brandeis thought that the law should
provide both a criminal and a private law remedy.”) (emphasis added).
28. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23 (arguing for expansion of the common
law to protect against intrusions of privacy based upon a legal right to privacy).  But
see De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148 (Mich. 1881) (recognizing a legal right to
privacy predicated upon the tort of battery prior to the publication of the Brandeis
article).
29. For more discussion on the legal right of privacy, see generally James Barron,
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890):  Demystifying a
Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979) (analyzing the traditional view
of the Warren and Brandeis article and criticizing it as a “quaint example of
misguided legal scholarship” of limited utility to issues of privacy protection);
Fredrick Davis, What Do We Mean By “Right To Privacy,” 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1959)
(rebuffing judicial recognition of privacy as derivative of the more elementary
interests of infliction of mental suffering and the expropriation of some property
interest); Gormley, supra note 25, at 1335 (surveying the development of privacy law
one hundred years after the publication of the Warren and Brandeis law review
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and Brandeis first embedded legal privacy in the principle of an
individual’s “inviolate personality.”30  Privacy, they argued, “must be
placed upon a broader foundation” than that provided by the
existing doctrines of trust and contract.31  Abandoning a theory of
property, these forward-thinking scholars explained that privacy
rights are distinct rights that exist “against the world.”32  Although
Warren and Brandeis never precisely defined the ideal of an inviolate
personality, others have subsequently described it “as a condition and
right that is essentially tied to human dignity, the principle of equal
respect for persons, and the notion of personhood itself.”33
Therefore, by advocating an expansion of the common law, initially
considered a radical stance,34 Warren and Brandeis were merely
                                                                
article); William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (distilling four distinct
privacy torts from the original one advocated by Warren and Brandeis); Richard
Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article:  The Emerging Unencumbered
Constitutional Right To Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1990)
(examining the jurisprudential development of the right to privacy and arguing for
the adoption of a right to informational privacy).
30. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205.  Elaborating on the concept of
privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated that “[t]he principle which protects personal
writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical
appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of
private property, but that of an inviolate personality.”  Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 211.  Warren and Brandeis argued that:
[S]ince the latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to
take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are
inadequate to support the required protection, and the law of tort must be
resorted to.  The right of property in its widest sense, including all
possession, including all rights and privileges, and hence embracing the
right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which
the protection which the individual demands can be rested.
Id.
32. Id. at 213.  In rejecting the principle of private property and using the
principle of the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated that:
[T]he principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality
not the principle of private property, unless that word be used in an
extended and unusual sense.  The principle which protects personal writings
and any other productions of intellect or of the emotions, is the right to
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this
protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestic or otherwise.
Id.
33. Turkington, supra note 29, at 484-85; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing, subsequently, inviolate
personality as “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men”).
34. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902)
(rejecting the tort of invasion of privacy as lacking legal precedent and stating that
“[t]here is no precedent for such an action to be found in the decisions of this
court . . . . Mention of such a [privacy] right is not to be found in Blackstone, Kent or
any other of the great commentators upon the law”).  But see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON
& ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (1999) (noting that the
Roberson court was the first high state appellate court to confront the issue of whether
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articulating a belief deeply ingrained in the traditions and
understandings of common society:  a right to privacy exists and it
ought to be protected.35
B. Privacy and the Invasion of Video Voyeurism
In order to understand the harm that results from the specific
invasion committed by the video voyeur, it is necessary to give an
account of that which is violated.  In general terms, the video voyeur
infringes upon a sense of privacy.36  But what is the foundation of
privacy?37  In Western society, one of the most fundamental and
universal expectations of privacy involves the ability to control
exposure of one’s body.38  The human desire to limit the ability of
                                                                
privacy was actionable).  The court rejected the new tort, but in 1903 the New York
State Legislature enacted a civil cause of action for the invasion of privacy and thus
statutorily secured this right despite the court’s hesitance.  See id.
35. See E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen:  To His Reputation, SCRIBNER’S MAG.,
July 1890, at 65-67 (describing dignity as intimately tied to privacy), cited in Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195 n.6; see also Elbridge L. Adams, The Right to Privacy,
and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM . L. REV. 37, 37 (1905) (expressing that
Brandeis and Warren were influenced by the writings of Godkin, which were
published the same year as the drafting of the Brandeis and Warren article).  Godkin
wrote, “[p]ersonal dignity is the fine flower of civilization, and the more of it there is
in a community, the better off the community is . . . .  But without privacy its
cultivation or preservation is hardly possible.”  Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 723, 757 n.56 (1999) (discussing privacy issues and quoting Godkin's
work).
36. See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text (giving descriptions of the
invasive and intimidating nature of video voyeurism).
37. See Andrew D. Morton, Comment, Much Ado About Newsgathering:  Personal
Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi
Legislation, 147 U. PA . L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1999) (noting the difficulty in
enumerating a satisfactory definition of privacy).  Morton concludes:
Any attempt to articulate a precise definition of privacy mirrors Justice
Stewart’s oft-ridiculed directive for identifying obscenity—you’ll “know it
when you see it.”  Warren and Brandeis suggested that the concept of privacy
embodies “the right to be let alone.”  Another scholar asserted that the
notion of privacy is “related to solitude, secrecy and autonomy, but is not
synonymous with these terms.”  Others have identified their conception of
privacy as a “condition of inaccessibility of the person, his or her mental
states, or information about the person to the senses of surveillance devices
of others.”
Id. (citations omitted).
38. See Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law:  A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 272, 272 (1966) (arguing that nakedness has always been viewed as
shameful and that a sense of privacy is linked with the basic moral code of
individuals).  Discussing the basic nature of this expectation of privacy, Konvitz notes
that:
Almost the first page of the Bible introduces us to the feeling of shame as a
violation of privacy.  After Adam and Eve had eaten the fruit of the tree of
knowledge, ‘the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were
naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.’
Thus, mythically, we have been taught that our very knowledge of good and
evil—our moral nature, our nature of men—is somehow, by divine
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others to observe or to touch the naked body in the absence of
consent is so universal and ingrained that to argue otherwise would
simply be an affront to practical experience.39  The acute degradation
inherent in non-consensual disrobing that often occurs in situations
of war, imprisonment,40 and rape41 provides powerful evidence for the
                                                                
ordinance, linked with a sense and realm of privacy.  When, after the Flood,
Noah became drunk, he ‘lay uncovered in his tent,’ and Ham violated his
father’s privacy by looking upon his father’s nakedness and by telling his
brothers about it.  His brothers took a garment, ‘laid it upon their shoulders,
and walked backward and covered the nakedness of their father.  Their faces
were turned away, and they did not see their father’s nakedness.’
Id. (citations omitted).
Although Konvitz was not directly arguing that there is an intrinsic right of privacy
in the ability to control exposure of the naked body, these Biblical traditions speak
directly to that issue.  The zone of privacy surrounding the intimacy of the human
body is so natural and instinctive a quality, that the injury resulting from an
unwelcomed invasion of this right by the voyeur—video or otherwise—proves, all too
clearly, the truth of its existence.  See Allen, supra note 35, at 724 (claiming that
privacy is associated with ownership of personal property including homes, diaries,
reputations and body parts).
39. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973-74 (1964) (discussing the fundamental desire
for privacy with respect to one’s body).  Bloustein states that:
The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as
including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions.  This measure
of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its
abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is a
part of what our culture means by these concepts.  A man whose home may
be entered at the will of another, whose conversation may be overheard at
the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at
the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account.
He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in
fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.
Id.  An intrusion upon an individual’s privacy or sense of modesty, upon the
individual’s naked self, is no less an intrusion than any listed above.  It may be the
most unreasonable and offensive intrusion because the object of the intrusion is not
intimate thoughts or intimate space, but the very corpus of the individual, the naked
self.
40. Courts have recognized the opposite of voluntary disrobing, the compelled
strip search within the prison system, as a serious assault upon privacy and dignity
even when justified by the circumstances.  See, e.g., Marybeth G. v. City of Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing prison strip searches “involving the
visual inspection of the anal and genital areas as ‘demeaning, dehumanizing,
undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and]
signifying degradation and submission’” (citation omitted)).  The Seventh Circuit
concluded that “[i]n short, we can think of few exercises of authority by the state that
intrude on the citizen’s privacy and dignity as severely as the visual anal and genital
searches practiced here.”  Id.  See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring a prison’s practice of subjecting inmates to
mandatory body cavity searches after receiving a visitor from the outside to be “one
of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and common decency”);
Daugherty v. Campbell, 33 F.3d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A strip search, regardless
of how professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating
experience . . . .  Consequently, reasonable suspicion must exist before a strip search
is authorized for prison visitors.”); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir.
1985) (recognizing, “as have all courts that have considered the issue, the severe if
not gross interference with a person’s privacy that occurs when [prison] guards
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truth of the proposition that privacy is linked fundamentally to the
ability to control exposure of the human body.42
Individuals constantly take great precautions to ensure that either
certain bodily actions or specific body parts remain guarded from
public view.43  With flagrant disregard, the video voyeur blatantly
defies this legitimate desire for privacy by utilizing technology to
observe, record, and often to disseminate images of the very acts and
body parts that were never intended or reasonably assumed to be
open to public inspection.44  In effect, the video voyeur disrobes the
                                                                
conduct a visual inspection of body cavities”) (citations omitted).  If the government
may not invade individual privacy without reasonable suspicion lest it run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment, then, by analogy, why should video voyeurs be at liberty to
invade individual privacy without having any legal accountability, particularly when
there is no legitimate justification for their actions?
41. See Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy:  The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 232 (1995) (addressing the importance of a woman’s
integrity in her body and noting that disregard for this integrity is an integral
component of rape).  McClain recites:
Today the law of sexual assault is indispensable to the system of legal rules
that assures each of us the right to decide who may touch our bodies, when,
and under what circumstances.  The decision to engage in sexual relations
with another person is one of the most private and intimate decisions a
person can make.  Each person has the right not only to decide whether to
engage in sexual conduct with another, but also to control the circumstances
and character of that contact.
Id. (quoting State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (citation omitted)).
42. See Konvitz, supra note 38, at 272 (demonstrating the importance to humans
of concealing one’s nakedness); Karoline Jackson, The Legitimacy of Cross-Gender
Searches and Surveillance in Prisons:  Defining an Appropriate and Uniform Review, 73 IND.
L.J. 959, 980-81 (1998) (“If the right to privacy secured by the penumbras of the Bill
of Rights is to mean anything, it surely must protect the naked body.  There is
nothing more fundamentally private than the naked body and genitalia.”).
43. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229-32 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the fear of publication of nude pictures or pictures of private acts).  The
court noted that:
Although it is well known that every human being defecates, no adult human
being in our society wants a newspaper [or website] to show a picture of him
defecating.  The desire for privacy . . . is a mysterious but deep fact about
human personality.  It deserves and in our society receives legal protection.
An individual and more pertinently perhaps the community is most
offended by the publication of intimate personal facts when the community
has no interest in them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall
of privacy that surrounds a stranger.
Id.  This concept is well illustrated by the universal practice of wearing clothing while
in public, yet going behind closed doors in order to change or try on different
clothing.  Individuals seek privacy by the very act of wearing clothing as much as they
do by disrobing behind closed doors.  See discussion infra Parts III, IV (giving
examples of the desire for privacy).
44. See 20/20:  Video Voyeurism:  Voyeur Tapes Neighbors Private Moments (ABC
television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1999) (quoting a victim of video voyeurism expressing
her horror at being exposed in her private moment:  “It humbled me.  Nobody is
supposed to see me naked except for my husband.  And for someone to take private
moments from me—to tape nude videos of me, it made me very, very angry.  It
sickened me”); cf. Bloustein, supra note 39, at 973 (“The feeling of being naked
before the world can be produced by having to respond to a questionnaire or
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victim without knowledge or consent, and in so doing, strips the
victim of both privacy and dignity.
Faced with such a violation, the law is challenged to protect the
integrity of these victims.45  To properly criminalize video voyeurism,
however, the law must first adequately address both the nature of the
fundamental right to privacy46 and the scope of the invasion exacted
by the video voyeur.47  The difficulty remains that both criminal and
civil law fail to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
public space, and therefore fail to understand, at a very conceptual
level, the privacy violation committed by the modern video voyeur.48
For reasons that will be discussed, civil law furnishes an inadequate
vehicle to combat this invasion.49  Accordingly, criminal law becomes
the most viable mechanism for protecting privacy from the
humiliating intrusion wrought by such an abusive application of an
otherwise socially useful technology.50
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE HISTORY OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
A. Using Criminal Law to Enforce the Privacy Rights of Victims
Over the course of the last 100 years, American jurisprudence has
come to understand privacy as a right protected both under the
                                                                
psychological test as well as by having your bedroom open to prying eyes and ears.”).
As discussed in this Comment, the sense of being naked before the world need not
be confined to the bedroom but, due to modern technology, may be easily
reproduced in any public setting.  See discussion infra Parts III, IV (describing
instances where individuals were unknowingly taped in public settings).
45. Cf. Maria Pope, Technology Arms Peeping Toms With a New and Dangerous
Arsenal:  A Compelling Need for States to Adopt New Legislation, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1167, 1179-81 (1999) (noting that many plaintiffs fail to sustain
a cause of action in federal courts due to the lack of state statutes properly
addressing video voyeurism).
46. See supra notes 30-33, 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing privacy as
premised upon an individual’s inviolate personality and further defining the ability
to control exposure of the human body as a fundamental component of privacy).
47. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing the video voyeur as
virtually disrobing the victim through the use of modern surveillance technology
despite the victim’s legitimate desire for privacy).
48. See discussion infra Parts III, IV (discussing how historically an expectation of
privacy is not found in public places); see also Andrew McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law
Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability For Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV.
989 (1995) (arguing that tort law must be expanded to protect against invasions of
privacy committed by surreptitious videotaping that occur in the public space).
49. See discussion infra Parts II.C, III.D (explaining the reasons for the
inadequacy of the civil law in protecting the individual’s rights against the video
voyeur).
50. See discussion infra Parts II, III (discussing the relationship between criminal
law and privacy and stressing the importance of creating legislation that provides
criminal penalties for video voyeurs).
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Constitution51 and by the law of torts.52  Within the context of
criminal law, however, discussion of the right to privacy generally
arises only under the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment53 and centers upon the criminal procedure issues of
search and seizure.54  Thus, scholarly debate and legal development
has focused primarily upon the protection of the privacy rights
afforded to criminal defendants, rather than upon the privacy rights
of victims of criminal activity.55  Consequently, the criminalization of
privacy intrusions committed by non-state actors, such as video
voyeurs, has received minimal attention.56
                                                                
51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (upholding a woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy as a privacy right grounded in the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding a
Connecticut statute proscribing the use of contraceptives by married couples
unconstitutional, and explicitly recognizing a zone of privacy within the penumbra of
rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); cf.
Gormley, supra note 25, at 1394 (“The two-step leap-frog from Griswold to Roe thus
became the single most significant burst in the history of twentieth century
privacy.”).
52. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 389 (recognizing tort privacy as a complex of
four legally cognizable torts:  intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or solitude,
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness, public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts, and publicity that portrays a person in a false light); see also Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905) (“The right of privacy has its
foundation in the instincts of nature.  It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being
the witness that can be called to establish its existence.”); cf. Ettore v. Philco
Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) (characterizing the
confusion surrounding privacy law as a “haystack in a hurricane,” but affirmatively
recognizing the tort).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. See Burrows, supra note 1, at 1087 (noting that modern privacy jurisprudence
stems from interpreting the Fourth Amendment in the context of criminal
procedure issues); Gormley, supra note 25, at 1358 (“If privacy was explicitly
acknowledged anywhere in the early contours of American law, it was within the folds
of criminal procedure”).
55. The role of the criminal law as a shield against privacy intrusions committed
by non-state actors has received little attention.  See generally Bloustein, supra note 39,
at 964 (“[T]he historical development in the courts of the concept of privacy stems
from and is almost exclusively devoted to the quest for such a civil remedy.”); Adam
J. Tutaj, Comment, Intrusion Upon Seclusion:  Bringing an “Otherwise” Valid Cause of
Action Into the 21st Century, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 665, 665 (1999) (stating that the
majority of cases addressing the privacy implications of surveillance technology
involve Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, while the common law of non-
search and seizure privacy issues remains undeveloped).  Tutaj opines that criminal
defendants often raise surveillance issues as they specifically relate to their arrest,
whereas potential civil plaintiffs are often unaware that they have been videotaped
and, therefore, never file suit.  See id. at 666.  The implication is that non-Fourth
Amendment privacy issues are rarely raised.  See id.
56. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides a useful point of comparison, but
is fundamentally inapplicable.  This Comment specifically argues that there is a need
to criminalize certain forms of surreptitious video surveillance committed by private
actors, for the very reason that the protections and remedies afforded under the
Fourth Amendment only apply when the intrusive conduct is committed by the state.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (asserting that the core of
the Fourth Amendment is to “be free from unreasonable government intrusion”)
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From a theoretical perspective, criminal protection against privacy
intrusions committed by private actors arises indirectly through the
enforcement of crimes that infringe generally upon person and
property,57 or upon the public order.58  Perhaps the most illustrative
example is the criminal prohibition of the classic voyeur:  the
                                                                
(emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable
government searches and seizures); Irwin Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law:  A Century
Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 705 (1990) (“Far from
establishing a constitutional right to privacy, the fourth amendment only prevented
government officials from unlawfully intruding into the home or personal property,
leaving private citizens free to invade the privacies of life at will.”); cf. Bloustein, supra
note 39, at 975 (noting similarity of intrusion whether by government agent or
private individual).  Bloustein states that:
This is not to say, however, that intrusion is a different wrong when
perpetrated by an FBI agent and when perpetrated by a next door neighbor;
nor is it to say that the gist of the wrong is different in the two cases.  The
threat to individual liberty is undoubtedly greater when a policeman taps a
telephone than when an estranged spouse does, but a similar wrong is
perpetrated in both instances.  Thus, the conception of privacy generated by
the [F]ourth [A]mendment cases may rightly be taken, I would urge, as
being applicable to any instance of intrusion even though remedies under
the [F]ourth [A]mendment are not available in all such instances.
Id.
In the landmark decision Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of privacy rights over the unwarranted intrusion of the use of
audio surveillance technology by the government.  See id. at 359 (refusing to insulate
electronic surveillance from the unreasonable search and seizure protections of the
Fourth Amendment).  The Court declared that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”  Id. at 351.  The Court continued, “what [an individual] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.” Id.  Although these protections apply only against the government, the
Katz decision seemingly supports the recognition of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the public space against private actors.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that privacy protection attaches when two requirements are
met:  “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable”).  Despite the law’s formalistic insistence to the contrary, it is difficult to
imagine that society is not prepared to recognize some expectations of privacy in
public—particularly those as are violated by the video voyeur—as objectively
reasonable.
Ironically, scholars sharply criticize the Katz doctrine as producing the opposite
effect of allowing technology to marginalize privacy rights.  See William Shepard
McAninch, Unreasonable Expectations:  The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment, 20
STETSON L. REV. 435, 439-40 (1991) (concluding that the Katz “reasonable
expectations” test is flawed, and that its application has undermined privacy rights in
the face of technology).
57. See Gormley, supra note 25, at 1343 (suggesting that the “basic kernels of
privacy” can be found in the early American common law crimes of trespass, assault,
and battery); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205 (comparing privacy
invasion to assault and battery, and concluding that prohibition of these wrongs was
“merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual
to be let alone”); Kramer, supra note 56, at 705-06 (suggesting that nineteenth
century courts remedied some privacy invasions under trespass actions).
58. See generally 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 5 (1997)
(defining a breach of the peace as a violation of the public order amounting to “a
disturbance of the public tranquility, by an act or conduct either directly or indirectly
having this effect, or by inciting or tending to incite such a disturbance”).
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Peeping Tom.59  Although originally unknown at common law,60 the
act of window peeping—the unsophisticated precursor of video
voyeurism61—historically was prosecuted under the crimes of
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace.62  Therefore, under the
                                                                
59. See Bill Prewett, Act 62:  The Crimination of Peeping Toms and Other Men of Vision,
5 ARK. L. REV. 388, 388 (1951) (defining a Peeping Tom as “one who peeps through
windows or doors, or other like places, on or about the premises of another, for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon”).  See
generally Jon Auerbach, Neighbors:  We’re Being Watched, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1995,
at West Weekly 1 (explaining that the term Peeping Tom originated in England in
the year 1040 in connection with the story of Lady Godiva).  As the legend is told, in
the year 1040, Lady Godiva rode naked through the streets of Coventry in protest of
a tax imposed by her husband, the Earle of Mercia.  See id.  The people of Coventry
were instructed to stay indoors with windows covered; one man, however, defied the
order. See id.  As punishment, he was blinded and branded with the nickname
“Peeping Tom.”  See id.  For a poetic rendition of this story, see Alfred Lord
Tennyson, Godiva, in 2 THE POEMS OF TENNYSON 171, 175-76 (Christopher Ricks ed.,
2d ed. 1987).
60. See Prewett, supra note 59, at 388 (stating that the specific crime of window
peeping was unknown at common law).
61. See Menon, supra note 4 (discussing the boom of television and Internet
voyeurism in contemporary culture and noting that sensory exposure was bound
historically by a person’s geographic location).  Now, however, modern technology
allows people to peep without being present.  See id.  University of Illinois Professor
Steve Jones stated, “[p]art of what is going on now is that [with technology] one can
be a voyeur without putting one’s self at great risk.  Had you been a Peeping Tom 20
years ago, you would have had to go peer over the ledge of somebody’s window.”  Id.
62. See Carey v. District of Columbia, 102 A.2d 314, 315 (D.C. 1954) (convicting a
defendant of disorderly conduct for peeping in the window of an occupied, lighted
room during the early morning hours); Commonwealth v. LePore, 666 N.E.2d 152,
155-56 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996) (charting the history of voyeurism crimes prosecuted
under the crime of disorderly conduct across many states, while affirming a
defendant’s conviction for voyeurism); City of Grand Rapids v. Williams, 70 N.W.
547, 548 (Mich. 1897) (convicting a defendant of disorderly conduct for peering into
the window of an occupied residence near midnight); State v. Kitchen, No. 16839,
1998 WL 811580, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1998) (unpublished opinion)
(convicting a defendant of voyeurism for peering into the window of an occupied
living room with a lewd intent); cf. State v. Reynolds, 66 N.W.2d 886, 889-91 (Minn.
1954) (explaining that disorderly conduct and breach of peace are highly
interrelated).  In Williams, the Michigan Supreme Court stated, “we cannot conceive
of any conduct much more indecent and insulting than for a stranger to be peeking
into the windows of an occupied, lighted residence, and especially at the hours of
night when people usually retire.”  70 N.W. at 548.
Breach of the peace was a crime at common law, but disorderly conduct is a
statutory offense that lacks a precise definition.  See State v. Boyer, 198 A.2d 222, 224-
25 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963) (clarifying that disorderly conduct was not a crime at
common law and is punishable only by statute); Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720, 742
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (observing that the offense of breach of the peace had its origin in
the common law); Tessier v. La Nois, 198 A.2d 142, 144 (R.I. 1964) (insisting that
disorderly conduct was not recognized at common law).  Disorderly conduct,
however, tends to breach the peace, incite a public disturbance, disrupt the public
order, or endanger the safety or welfare of a community.  See Biddle v. Martin, 992
F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1993) (establishing that under Illinois statutory law a person
commits disorderly conduct when she unreasonably performs any act to breach the
peace); Currier v. Baldridge, 914 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
behavior provoking a disturbance constitutes disorderly conduct under Wisconsin
law); City of Pineville v. Marshall, 299 S.W. 1072, 1074 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (declaring
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rubric of maintaining the public order, criminal law undertook, at
least collaterally, to vindicate voyeuristic intrusions premised upon a
right to privacy.
More recently, this conduct has been prosecuted under specific
Peeping Tom statutes,63 thus evidencing a more specific attempt to
prohibit voyeuristic conduct and by corollary, to protect individual
privacy.  Today, the criminalization of privacy intrusion is firmly
established in many state penal codes, falling under a wide variety of
crimes:  trespass,64 window peeking,65 secret peeping,66
eavesdropping,67 indecent viewing or photography,68 violation of
                                                                
that conduct is disorderly if it jeopardizes public safety); Oak Creek v. King, 436
N.W.2d 285, 290 (Wis. 1989) (ruling that action “having the tendency to disrupt
good order” is disorderly conduct in Wisconsin).
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 820 (1995) (defining a Peeping Tom as a
trespasser who “knowingly enters upon the occupied property or premises of
another . . . with intent to peer or peep into the window or door of such property or
premises”); GA . CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (1999) (defining a Peeping Tom as “one who
peeps through windows or doors, or other like places, on or about the premises of
another for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied
upon and the doing of any other acts of a similar nature”); LA . REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:284 (West 1986) (defining a Peeping Tom as “one who peeps through windows
or doors, or other like places, situated on or about the premises of another for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of persons spied upon without the
consent of the persons spied upon”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1171 (West 1983 &
Supp. 2000) (defining a Peeping Tom as a “person who hides, waits or otherwise
loiters in the vicinity of any . . . place of residence with the unlawful and willful intent
to watch, gaze, or look upon the occupants therein in a clandestine manner”); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (defining a Peeping Tom in the same
manner as the Georgia statute).
64. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1504 (West 1989) (defining “criminal
trespass” as the illegal entering of a residential structure or yard, and the looking
into a residence with “reckless disregard of infringing on the inhabitant’s right of
privacy”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 820 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (defining “trespassing
with intent to peer or peep” as when a person “knowingly enters upon the occupied
property or premises of another utilized as a dwelling, with intent to peer or peep
into the window or door of such property or premises and who . . . otherwise acts in a
manner commonly referred to as ‘Peeping Tom’”).
65. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-3 (Michie 1998) (describing “window
peeking” as the entry onto the private property to “peek in the door or window of
any inhabited building or structure located thereon”).
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1999) (defining “peeping” as when any
individual looks secretly into a room occupied by a female person); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-130 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining “[p]eeping” as when a person
“secretly or furtively peep[s], sp[ies] or attempt[s] to peep or spy into or through a
window, door or other aperture”).
67. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1975) (describing “[c]riminal
eavesdropping” as when a person intentionally uses a devise to eavesdrop); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a
person “intentionally and without . . . consent . . . eavesdrops upon or records the
confidential communication”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304 (1999) (defining
“[e]avesdropping” as when a person not present for a conversation “[k]nowingly
overhears or records such conversation or discussion without the consent . . . [or] for
the purpose of committing, aiding, or abetting the commission of an unlawful act; or
knowingly . . . attempts to use or disclose . . . the contents of any such conversation or
discussion”); GA . CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2000) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as any
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privacy,69 voyeurism,70 unlawful photographing,71 as well as
                                                                
attempt “in a clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or
record . . . the private conversation of another which shall originate in any private
place”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (1995) (defining “eavesdropping” as the
intentional entry into a private place for the purpose of surreptitiously listening to
private communications or observing private conduct); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.010
(Banks-Baldwin 1999) (describing “eavesdropping” as the intentional use of any
device to “overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a wire or oral
communication of others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto”);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.807(1)-(4) (Law Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1999) (defining
“eavesdropping” as the intentional trespass onto another’s property or use of any
device to “overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of the private discourse of
others without the permission of all persons engaged in the discourse”); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2000) (describing “eavesdropping” as the unlawful
“wiretapping, mechanical overhearing of a conversation, or interception or accessing
an electronic communication”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (1997) (defining
“felony eavesdropping” as the intentional interception of any communication “by use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device,” and “misdemeanor eavesdropping”
as the secret lingering about a private place with “intent to overhear discourse or
conversation therein”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1202 (1983) (describing eavesdropping
as “secretly loitering about any building, with intent to overhear discourse therein,
and to repeat or publish the same to vex, annoy, or injure others”); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-21-1 (Michie 1998) (defining “eavesdropping” as a trespass with intent to
eavesdrop in a private place, or an installation of any device for “observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in such
place”).
68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123 (Lexis 1998) (defining “indecent viewing or
photography” as when a person “knowingly views, or produces a picture of, the
private exposure of the genitals, anus, or female breast of another person . . . without
the knowledge or consent” of that person).
69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (1995) (defining a misdemeanor
invasion of privacy as a trespass on property for the purpose of eavesdropping or
other surveillance; or the installation of any device for observing, photographing,
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting in a private place without consent; or the
installation of any device outside a private place for hearing recording, amplifying or
broadcasting ordinarily inaudible sounds without consent); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 711-1111 (Michie 1993) (using the same definition for invasion of privacy as the
Delaware code); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.746 (West 1997) (defining “interference
with property” as when a person (1) enters upon another’s property;
(2) surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the window or any other aperture of a
house or place of dwelling of another; and (3) does so with intent to intrude upon or
interfere with the privacy of a member of the household”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 644:9 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining a violation of privacy as when a person installs
in a private place without consent any device for “observing, photographing,
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events,” or installs outside a private
place any similar device that records or transmits sounds not normally audible);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (Lexis 1999) (defining a “privacy violation” in the same
way as the Delaware and Hawaii statutes).
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.14 (West 1999) (defining voyeurism as when a
person “with lewd, lascivious, or indecent intent, secretly observes, photographs,
films, videotapes, or records another person when such other person is located in a
dwelling, structure, or conveyance and such location provides a reasonable
expectation of privacy”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-5 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998)
(describing a voyeur as someone who peeps or enters upon another’s property with
intent to peep, or who peeps into a place where an occupant can reasonably expect
to undress); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (1972) (defining “voyeurism” as a trespass by
a Peeping Tom); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08 (Anderson 1996) (defining the
crime of voyeurism as when a person “for the purpose of sexually arousing or
gratifying the person’s self . . . trespass[es] or otherwise surreptitiously invade[s] the
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unauthorized videotaping.72  Each of these statutes aims not only to
protect persons, property, or the public order, but equally each seeks
the protection of individual privacy.73  Accordingly, courts actively
employ the lexicon of privacy rights in the prosecution of these
crimes.74  Therefore, it is clear that criminal law serves as a vehicle for
the substantive protection of individual privacy.75
B. Using Criminal Law to Prohibit Video Voyeurism
Although criminal law acknowledges the concept of privacy rights
as a legitimate object of state protection, the extent and scope of this
protection varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.76  Overwhelmingly,
however, this protection does not extend to the public space and at
                                                                
privacy of another, to spy or eavesdrop . . . [or] to photograph the other person in a
state of nudity”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (West Supp. 2000) (defining
“voyeurism” as when “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of
any person, [a person] knowingly views, photographs, or films another person . . .
while the person being viewed, photographed or filmed is in a place where he or she
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
71. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-63 (Supp. 1999) (prohibiting the secret
photography of non-consenting persons in a place where those persons would be in a
“state of undress and have a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
72. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-4 (West Supp. 1999) (defining
“unauthorized videotaping” as the unlawful photographing, videotaping, or filming
of another person in a “restroom, tanning bed, or tanning salon” without that
person’s consent).
73. See sources cited supra notes 69-72 (listing state criminal codes, including
Georgia, South Carolina, and Washington, that protect individual privacy under the
guise of broader statutory offenses).
74. See Commonwealth v. De Wan, 124 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956)
(affirming the conviction of a defendant who engaged in “malicious prowling and
loitering”).  The De Wan court held that “[t]he mischief prohibited is that intentional
act, without legal justification or excuse, which has as its purpose injury to the
privacy, person or property of another.”  Id.; Copeland v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d
9, 11 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a conviction of window peeping where the
criminal statute forbids “surreptitious peeping with the intent to invade the privacy
of another”); In re James Shelton Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 391 (N.C. 1978) (upholding
the constitutionality of state Peeping Tom statute as not overly vague, because “the
act condemned must be a spying for the wrongful purpose of invading the privacy of
the female occupant of the room”).  But see Yoeckel v. Samonig, 75 N.W.2d 925, 926-
27 (Wis. 1956) (refusing to recognize the right of privacy by affirming the dismissal
of a complaint alleging that a tavern keeper photographed the plaintiff while she was
undressed in the tavern’s restroom).
75. However, the protection of individual privacy is limited to the extent that the
voyeuristic conduct causing the privacy intrusion actually can be prosecuted under
an existing crime, either statutory or common law.  See CBS Public Eye (CBS television
broadcast, Sept. 9, 1998) (“Although most states don’t have specific laws against
video voyeurism, that doesn’t mean these video violators can’t be arrested; they can.
But in many cases, the maximum charge they face is disorderly conduct or
trespassing, crimes for which the penalties are usually light.”); discussion infra Part
III (describing privacy invasions that were not actionable under existing statutes and
that spurred new legislation).
76. See discussion infra Parts III, IV (describing various state legal schemes to
protect individual privacy against intrusions from private actors).
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most serves only as a minimal deterrent to video voyeurism.77  Even
though Peeping Tom and other privacy legislation provide a
foundation for the prohibition of video voyeurism, they are of limited
utility as a conceptual model.
Today’s video voyeur may be little more than the next generation
of yesterday’s Peeping Tom.  Video voyeurism, however, is a far more
intrusive and disturbing wrong than mere window peeping.78  Modern
electronics have transformed the deviant, usually solitary, act of
peeping79 into a booming and perverse online-industry,80 built
specifically upon the exploitation of non-consensual pornography.81
                                                                
77. See discussion infra Parts III, IV (explaining the flaws inherent in existing state
codes that seek to prevent and criminalize voyeurism).
78. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 48, at 1021 (quoting Justice Douglas, dissenting
in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971), as describing the impact of the
video camera as “the greatest leveler of human privacy ever”); Eric Fidler, Creepy
Peepers Lurk Anywhere, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1999, at 8A (quoting a victim who
was videotaped while changing in the locker room as stating, “I think it’s ridiculous
that it’s so easy to just put this on the Internet.  It’s obviously a violation of privacy,
and they use us to sell videos—of us—for their monetary gain.”); States Cracking Down
on ‘Peeping Tom’ Cameras, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), Nov. 26, 1998, at A34
(quoting a Louisiana prosecutor handling a video voyeurism case as stating, “If I’m a
Peeping Tom and look into your bedroom, I can be prosecuted.  If I put a video
camera to do the same thing, and I do not record sound, I am committing no
crime.”); CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1999) (quoting a victim
whose bedroom and bathrooms were under video surveillance by her neighbor as
stating, “I need the darkness to protect me.  I’ve—it’s as if my skin’s been ripped off,
and so everything hurts . . . .”); Montel Williams Show (NBC television broadcast, Mar.
4, 1999) (quoting an audience member watching a show dedicated to video
voyeurism as stating, “[t]his makes me so angry.  After seeing this show, I feel like I
have to go back to my home, shut my windows and be careful if—if I wear skirts in
the mall or not.  That is sick.”).
79. See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1008 (3d ed. 1993) (defining
peeping as:  “To peek furtively; steal a quick glance”).
80. See, e.g., 1 Hidden Voyeur Camera (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.1hiddenvoyeurcamera.com/page1.html> (bragging about the riskiest
voyeur footage in the world and the best hidden cameras in bathrooms and locker
rooms); Undies and Upskirts (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.undiesandupskirts.
com> (claiming to have hundreds of the best ‘panty pics’ and upskirt images);
Upskirts.com (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.upskirts.com/index.html>
(advertising to be the original web site for “upskirts” photography); Upskirts Sex Voyeur
(visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.upskirtssexvoyeur.com/home.html> (claiming
to have the largest and most sophisticated collection of “upskirts” pictures and live
cameras on the internet); see also, e.g., Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping:  It’s Growing, It’s
Frustrating, and It’s Legal, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), June 26, 1998, at A1
(discussing video voyeurism, specifically “up-skirting,” as a new form of urban
hunting, and quoting Robert Roy, a worker for the parent company of an Internet
site that publishes voyeuristic photos, as explaining that, “[m]en use to bring down a
head of an animal as a trophy.  Now it’s panties.”); Interview by Montel Williams with
Raymond Zane, New Jersey State Senator, Montel Williams Show (NBC television
broadcast, Mar. 4, 1999) (decrying the changes in contemporary society that allow
video voyeurs to profit from an extensive market for illicit pictures).  Senator Zane
stated, “[o]ur entire society is changing . . . there are people like the [voyeurs] of the
world that are making a fortune on this and there is a market for it.”  Id.
81. See Fidler, supra note 78, at 8A (describing the widespread practice of using
hidden cameras to videotape people in the nude without their consent and the vast
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Furthermore, when committed in the public space, the invasion of
video voyeurism becomes manifestly unjust because an adequate legal
remedy is unavailable to victims.82  In effect, the failure of criminal
law to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public
space tacitly grants the video voyeur a license to act with impunity,
and leaves victims with little or no recourse.83
C. The Failure of the Civil Law’s Privacy Tort of Intrusion
Absent a criminal sanction, victims of video voyeurism must rely
upon civil remedies to find any semblance of restitution or
vindication.84  As noted above, however, civil law’s understanding of
privacy suffers from the same lethal deficiency as criminal law:  as a
general matter, no right to privacy exists in the public space.85  “Tort
law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot be invaded
in or from a public place.”86  Therefore, individuals who are
                                                                
Internet market for those pictures).  One former college athlete who was victimized
by hidden cameras while undressing in the locker room said:  “Anyone’s son or
daughter can be on the Internet; anyone’s brother or sister can be on the Internet.
That’s rather disgusting when you think about it.”  Id.
82. See discussion infra Part III.D (criticizing the distinction between public and
private space, and particularly the lack of legal protections for individual privacy in
public places).
83. See discussion infra Part III.D (asserting that the present conceptual
understanding of privacy in the legal community fails to provide sufficient safeguards
to victims).
84. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing various criminal remedies that may be
available to combat video voyeurism, but noting the remedies are not available for
intrusions occurring in public places); see also Gloria Gonzales & Laura Trujillo,
Privacy Comes with No Guarantees, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 1996, at A1
(reporting on a secret videotaping incident and noting that “[secretly videotaping
people was] no crime.  There is no state law against videotaping adults without their
knowledge . . . [and] [a]dults who are taped without their consent have little
recourse other than filing a civil suit against the person who taped them”); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (defining the privacy tort of
intrusion upon seclusion—a possible civil remedy).  According to section 652B,
“[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs and concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 652B.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (explaining that liability
arises only when individuals violate private space or private seclusion).  Comment C
states:
The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section only
when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.  Thus
there is no liability . . . for observing him or even taking his photograph
while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion,
and his appearance is public and open to the public eye.
Id.; see McClurg, supra note 48, at 991-92 (asserting that tort law offers only limited
security against “intrusive videotaping, photography or surveillance” when an
individual ventures into the public domain).
86. McClurg, supra note 48, at 990.  Professor McClurg continues:  “[H]owever
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surreptitiously captured on film or video in an exposed state, despite
their reasonable efforts to remain fully clothed while in the public
space, face a similar conceptual challenge in raising a civil cause of
action as confronts criminal law.87
As with all staunch rules, there are exceptions that follow.88
Peculiarly, the few cases that have deviated from this canonical
principle have apparently secured little value as lasting legal
precedent.89  At least two prominent cases amid the relatively select
progeny of privacy case law, bearing strong factual resemblance to
the actual intrusion here analyzed, appear to have recognized an
actionable invasion of privacy in the public setting.  An 1890s New
York case90 involving a Broadway actress, Marion Manola, at least
ostensibly recognized the actress’s privacy rights, whose “appearance
in tights . . . was, by means of a flashlight, photographed
surreptitiously and without her consent.”91  Of seemingly even greater
significance, a 1964 Alabama case, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,92
explicitly found the taking of a photograph of a woman, whose skirt
was blown up unexpectedly by an air vent as she exited a funhouse, to
                                                                
sound this rule once may have been, it is flawed in a modern technological society
where the camcorder has become a permanent fixture.”  Id. at 990-91.
87. See Morton, supra note 37, at 1444 (maintaining that because tort law
“generally supports the proposition that an individual in public implicitly has
consented to being photographed,” it fails to guard against “intrusive photography,
videotaping, or surveillance of subjects located in, or in plain view from, a public
space”).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (“Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or
lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of
privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”).
89. See McClurg, supra note 48, at 1044-45 (claiming that courts are reluctant to
recognize actions for violations of privacy rights while in public).  McClurg states:
In disposing of claims arising in public intrusion contexts, courts are
generally content to recite the rule that a person in public has no cognizable
privacy claim.  However, in several cases courts have intuitively recognized a
right to recover for invasion of privacy under circumstances amounting to a
public intrusion.  The opinions in these cases are radically underwritten and
recognition of the right is usually by implication only.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195 n.7 (citing Marion Manola v.
Stevens & Myers, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890) (unpublished opinion), N.Y. TIMES of June 15,
18, 21, 1890); see also Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 401, 402-19 (1990) (extensively discussing the case of Marion Manola and
further positing that the concept of “inviolate personality” is comprised of two inter-
related aspects:  emotional integrity as well as proprietary rights).
91. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195 n.7.  Cited by Warren and Brandeis
in their historic article, the case of Marion Manola resulted in the issuance of a
preliminary injunction issued ex parte and has been recognized as one of the first
cases to articulate an actionable concept of privacy.  See id.
92. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
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be an invasion of privacy.93
Both cases involved the surreptitious photographing, by a stranger,
of another individual within the public space whose image was, by
virtue of the recording, forcibly preserved while in a state of
compromised modesty.94  The prevailing rule, denying the existence
of legally protected privacy in the public space, however, continues to
remain unscathed and unaffected.95  In fact, not only does civil law
generally refuse to recognize an expectation of privacy in public
space, there is persuasive sentiment that “the right of privacy in tort
law is shrinking.”96  Therefore, despite some exceptions to the
contrary, the administration of privacy protection through the civil
law continues not only to be suspect, but outright hostile to the
privacy tort of intrusion.97
                                                                
93. See id. at 478 (affirming judgment for plaintiff in a tort action against a
newspaper for the invasion of privacy in public place for publication, without
consent, of a photograph of the plaintiff while her dress had been blown above her
waist by an air vent as she exited a funhouse during a county fair).  In fact, this case
became the exact fact pattern for the exception to the general rule as articulated by
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c, illus. 7 (1977).  The Restatement
illustration poses:
A, a young woman, attends a “Fun House,” a public place of amusement
where various tricks are played upon visitors.  While she is there a concealed
jet of compressed air blows her skirts over her head, and reveals her
underwear.  B takes a photograph of her in that position.  B has invaded A’s
privacy.
Id.  This exception seemingly provides the necessary legal profile to make actionable
precisely the public invasion of privacy exacted by video voyeurs.  As a practical
matter, however, it appears to remain in near obscurity.
94. See Graham, 162 So. 2d at 476 (noting that the plaintiff was photographed
when her dress was blown by air jets, exposing her body from the waist down);
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195 (noting that Manola was photographed
while playing a role that required that she wear tights).
95. See, e.g., Muratore, 656 F. Supp. at 483 (denying a passenger on a cruise ship
an action for invasion of privacy for harassing photographs because the pictures were
all taken in public areas of the ship); Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015,
1018 (D. Kan. 1986) (“The plaintiffs must show that there has been some aspect of
their private affairs which has been intruded upon and does not apply to matters
which occur in a public place or place otherwise open to the public eye.”); Fogel v.
Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[T]his tort does not apply to
matters which occur in a public place or a place otherwise open to the public eye.”);
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (D. Minn. 1948)
(holding that a litigant in a court proceeding did not have an action for invasion of
privacy when a newspaper photographer took his picture against his wishes while in
the courtroom).
96. McClurg comments:
Indeed, it is not hyperbole to suggest that the right may be approaching
extinction, at least in some of its variants.  Judges have been the engineers of
the tort’s destruction, both by the rules of positive law they have fashioned
and, just as significantly, in the way they administer the tort.
McClurg, supra note 48, at 996 (citations omitted).
97. See id. at 1000 (“Of the forty-nine invasion of privacy cases reported by state
courts in 1992, trial courts granted summary judgment to the defendant in twenty-
one of the cases, and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in
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Besides the general inapplicability of civil law to privacy intrusions
occurring in the public space, other factors contribute to the
inadequacy of tort privacy.  To begin with, as a practical matter,
monetary relief will likely prove woefully inadequate.98  Even plaintiffs
who prevail in a civil suit are unlikely to receive adequate
compensation, because the majority of video voyeurism defendants
likely lack sufficient wealth to pay a sizeable damage award.99
Perhaps the greatest reason why civil law is an inadequate vehicle
to redress the anti-social behavior manifest in video voyeurism is the
simple fact that the majority of victims are never likely to realize that
they, in fact, have been victimized.100  Video voyeurism, and
particularly public video voyeurism, is intentionally clandestine and
by its very nature is committed surreptitiously.  Therefore, many
potential plaintiffs may never realize their privacy has been violated,
and consequently may never initiate a civil suit.101  When viewed in
this light, the argument has been made that, “in many cases, if the
criminal law does not provide a cloak of protection for the victim,
nothing will.”102
Therefore, despite the increasingly invasive nature of privacy
violations, civil law is neither an adequate catalyst for the substantive
protection of privacy, nor an effective deterrent against the
                                                                
fifteen of the cases.”) (citations omitted).
98. See H. Morley Swingle & Kevin Zoellner, Criminalizing Invasion of Privacy:
Taking a Big Stick to Peeping Toms, 52 J. MO. B. 345, 346 (1996) (suggesting that civil
actions are inadequate because most defendants do not have the resources to pay
large damage awards and most insurance policies do not cover intentional torts); see
also Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 8 (S.C. 1989) (holding that
the defendant’s insurance policy did not cover a judgment rendered in a civil suit for
intentional invasion of privacy, where the defendant surreptitiously filmed swimsuit
models as they changed clothing).
99. To illustrate this point, Swingle and Zoellner discuss the 1990 allegations that
entertainer Chuck Berry surreptitiously filmed multiple women while they used the
restroom of a restaurant that he owned, resulting in a million-dollar settlement.  See
Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 98, at 346. Unlike Chuck Berry, most defendants
convicted of video voyeurism are not likely to have sufficient wealth to pay such a
large award of damages.  See id.
100. See Rams, supra note 80, at A1 (“A civil invasion-of-privacy suit probably isn’t
plausible, because identifying the victims is virtually impossible.  The women don’t
know they are being filmed.  Their faces are rarely shown.”).
101. See Letter from Matthew Eaton, supra note 12 (alluding to the fact that the
women being filmed in the shopping mall were unaware of the action).  As the letter
indicates, none of the 18 victims realized that they had been videotaped, and it is
unlikely that any of them could have been located subsequently in order to inform
them of the videotaping.  See id.  Mall security, however, was able to intervene on
behalf of these individuals under the suspicion that the perpetrator had broken a
criminal law.  See id.  Had public video voyeurism been a criminalized activity, then
the mall would have been able to press charges, and the perpetrator would have
been brought to justice.  See id. (stating that the District Attorney rejected the case
because there was no specific law that covered the case).
102. Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 98, at 346.
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deleterious behavior manifest in video voyeurism.103  The tort of
privacy, itself long considered the “problem child” of civil law,104
requires a fully developed counterpart within criminal law.  In order
to effect the necessary change, the law must re-conceptualize the
right of privacy to acknowledge and encompass an aspect of privacy
that is universal and fundamental—the right to control exposure of
one’s body.105  To this end, lawmakers must recognize that a
legitimate expectation of privacy can and does exist in the public
space.
III. CRITICIZING THE DOMINANT RATIONALE OF VIDEO VOYEURISM
PROHIBITION:  REVEALING AN ESSENTIAL FLAW IN CRIMINAL LAW’S
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The following examples represent the current state of the law
regarding an individual’s privacy interests in controlling exposure to
his or her intimate body.  The majority of states may have begun to
address the issue of video voyeurism, however these attempts all too
clearly demonstrate that advances in today’s technology have
rendered yesterday’s conception of privacy flawed and outdated.
A. Case Study:  Missouri
In 1994, the people of the state of Missouri were shocked to learn
that a tanning salon proprietor surreptitiously videotaped more than
100 women while they tanned in the nude.106  The real injustice,
                                                                
103. See John Jurata, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away:  The Subtle Reemergence of Public
Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN D IEGO L. REV. 489, 531-32 (1999) (explaining why
plaintiffs are likely to lose in court even when their pictures are published on the
Internet).  Jurata explains:
Using hidden video cameras, participants in “cyber peeping” sneak pictures
down the blouses and up the skirts of unsuspecting women in public places,
then publish such pictures on Internet Web sites for profit.  Although the
secret film taking is currently legal because it occurs in public, the
publication of such pictures on the Internet most likely falls within the
domain of the private facts tort.  However, as a practical matter, it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to win in court for two
reasons.  First, it is unlikely that a woman would even know that she had
been photographed and placed on the Web.  Second, even if a woman
suspected she had been photographed, the limited nature of the Internet
pictures make determining or proving the victim’s identity nearly impossible.
Id. (citations omitted).
104. See Tutaj, supra note 55, at 666 (noting that courts have struggled with
striking a balance between protecting an individual’s right to seclusion and
protecting freedom of action).
105. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (offering various descriptions of
the concept of privacy in an attempt to create a tangible definition).
106. See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 98, at 345 (discussing this incidence of
video voyeurism).
ROTHENBERGPP.DOC 6/18/2001  1:06 PM
2000] RE-THINKING PRIVACY 1151
however, is that the owner could not be held criminally liable for
video voyeurism.107  Missouri law simply did not prohibit this conduct,
or anything like it.108  The state responded rapidly by passing new
legislation that criminalized the nonconsensual filming of any
individual who is in a “state of full or partial nudity and is in a place
where he would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”109  The
Missouri privacy statute was quickly lauded as “model legislation.”110
Although the statute advanced the protection of victims’ privacy
rights, it continues to limit legitimate privacy expectation to “non-
public” places.111  The statute fails to recognize that today’s voyeur,
equipped with modern surveillance technology, can violate the
privacy of a fully-clothed individual in a public setting almost as easily
as it can be to intrude upon the privacy of a naked individual behind
the traditionally understood closed door.112
The Missouri statute expressly protects privacy in any place that
justifies what the statute’s language labels as the victim’s “reasonable
                                                                
107. See Tanning Salon Worker Charged With Taping Naked Teen-Agers, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1994, at 10A (reporting that prosecutors were able to charge
defendant with five counts of felony child abuse due to the fact that a few of the
videotaped women were under the age of 18).
108. See Scores of Women Taped By Hidden Camera In Tanning Booth; Authorities Say,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10128020 (reporting that
although both the sheriff’s and prosecutor’s daughters were among those who were
videotaped, no legal action could be taken against the suspect because Missouri law
did not prohibit surreptitious videotaping).
109. 1995 Mo. Legis. Serv. 160 (West) (codified at MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.253 (West
1999)).
110. Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 98, at 345 (“The [Missouri] law may serve as
model legislation.”).
111. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.250(3) (West 1999) (limiting privacy expectations
to places where a person would believe that she could disrobe “without being
concerned that the person's undressing was being viewed, photographed or filmed
by another”).
112. Compare, e.g., Letter from Matthew Eaton, supra note 12 and accompanying
text (describing a video voyeur surreptitiously filming up the skirts of 18 women on
an escalator in a public shopping mall), and Bedell, supra note 4, at 53 (describing
the influx of webcams as tools for the modern voyeur), with Harry Kalven, Privacy in
Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331-32
(1966) (rejecting tort privacy as advocated by Brandeis and Warren and as expanded
by Prosser).  Kalven notes that some instances of voyeurism that otherwise lack the
traditional elements of trespass may constitute an actionable offense worthy of legal
entitlement, but ultimately dismisses these cases as too few to be of concern.  See id.
In his 1966 article, Kalven noted:  “It is an interesting challenge to fit in these cases
[non-trespassory peeping crimes] conceptually, but the problem appears to be de
minimis.  It seems dubious doctrine, therefore, to dignify this cluster as a major
subcategory.”  Id. at 331-32.  With the proliferation of modern electronics, however,
not only has it become quite easy to commit acts of voyeurism without the
commission of a trespass, but, apparently, it is also becoming quite commonplace.
Therefore, it can no longer be sufficient, if it ever was, to merely dismiss the injury
wrought by such invasions as de minimus.  To the contrary, it is time to adopt an
expectation of privacy in the public space in order, specifically, to criminalize these
intrusions.
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expectation of privacy.”113  The statute further defines such a place as,
“any place where a reasonable person would believe that a person
could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that the person’s
undressing was being viewed, photographed or filmed by another.”114
In other words, the statute specifically exempts public places.115
Therefore, the statute embodies a fundamental flaw:  it fails to
recognize the critical relationship between the nature of the right of
privacy and the scope of the prohibited intrusion.  Current
technology effectively enables the video voyeur to pierce the privacy
protections traditionally enjoyed by fully clothed individuals;116 thus,
the distinction between public and private space is all but irrelevant.
B. Case Study:  New Jersey
Four years after the Missouri tanning parlor incident, a New Jersey
building superintendent was arrested for secretly installing “an
elaborate system of tiny cameras, microphones, and video-recording
equipment” in the apartment units of two female tenants.117  These
hidden cameras, each equipped with a wide-angle lens about the size
of a postage stamp,118 provided the building manager with five
months of unadulterated access into the bedrooms of the
unsuspecting victims.119
In a scenario disturbingly similar to the Missouri case, the building
                                                                
113. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.253(1).
114. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.250(3).
115. See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 98, at 346-47 (interpreting the statute to
include “private homes, dressing rooms, tanning booths, college dormitory rooms,
and restrooms” as “the sorts of places protected,” while excluding “[p]ublic beaches,
parks and swimming pools”).  However, video voyeurs do not just lurk around
swimming pools and beaches.  These crimes may be committed in any public setting,
and, thus, the statute’s reach falls far short of its intended goal.
116. See In Brief, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 30, 1999 (reporting the story of a man who
obtained voyeuristic images by placing a bag with a hidden camera concealed under
the legs of a female shopper at an area mall); see also Surreptitious Visual Recording For
Sexual Gratification:  Hearing on A.B. 182 Before the Senate Comm. on Pub. Safety, 1999-
2000 Legis. Sess. (Cal. June 8, 1999) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 182] (discussing
advanced infra-red technology capable of allowing the user to virtually see through
the clothing of another), available in WL, CCA Database, Comm. Rep. A.B. 182 File.
117. See Wayne Parry, Female Tenants Filmed in the Nude:  Hidden Cameras Found in
Apartments,  THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 9, 1998, at 56 (describing the
arrest of a man who had wired miniature cameras that enabled him to see through
an aperture no larger than a nail hole inside the apartments of two female residents
in a building of which he was the superintendent).
118. See Manager Imprisoned for Spying on Tenants:  Hidden Cameras Videotaped Women,
THE RECORD (Northern N.J.), Apr. 18, 1999, at A8 [hereinafter Manager Imprisoned]
(describing the technology, including cameras and microphones, used to tape the
women’s bedrooms).
119. See id. (noting that the defendant was only caught when one of the women
being taped overheard him describing his videotaping).
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manager could not be prosecuted for video voyeurism.120  He was
convicted, rather, on two counts of illegal wiretapping, because in
addition to the visual image, the videotape also recorded an audio
signal.121  In response to this loophole in the state’s privacy laws,122 the
New Jersey legislature has considered legislation designed to confront
the increasing crime of video voyeurism.123  The 1999 New Jersey bill,
A.B. 3441,124 is designed to prohibit the use or installation of video
surveillance equipment within “a private place for the purpose of
surreptitiously observing or recording the image of another
person.”125  The bill further defines a private place as “a place where a
person may reasonably expect to be safe from intrusion or
surveillance but does not include a place to which the public or a
substantial group of the public has access.”126  There is little doubt
that this bill would protect New Jersey residents from becoming
victims of video voyeurism while inside their apartments.127  This bill
would also likely protect individuals who are surreptitiously filmed in
retail dressing rooms or restaurant bathrooms.128
                                                                
120. See Parry, supra note 117, at 56 (stating that if the defendant had not used
microphones to record sound than he could not have been charged with a serious
offense, because it was not illegal to videotape just the visual images).
121. See Manager Imprisoned, supra note 118, at A08 (reporting that the defendant is
now serving a four-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to the following two
wiretap violations:  (1) interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral
communications; and (2) possession, manufacture, or assembly of a device for
interception of wire, electronic or oral communications).
122. See Fred Aun, Carpenter Charged in ‘Peeping Tom’ Case, THE STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 3, 1999, at 38 (reporting a simmilar incident of video voyeurism,
and reiterating that the creation of voyeuristic videotape absent audio signal is not
illegal).
123. See A.B. 3441, 208th Legis. Sess. (N.J. 1999) (making the act of installing or
using a video surveillance device a third-degree crime).  As of the time of publication
of this Comment, the New Jersey legislature has not yet passed this bill, and A.B.
3441 reportedly died in committee in 1999; it has not been re-introduced to date.  See
Mary Ann Marshall, A Stranger is Watching . . . (Peeping Toms), COSMOPOLITAN, Feb. 1,
2000, at 212 (reporting on the growing incidence of video voyeurism and discussing
the pending New Jersey bill); Telephone Interview with Legislative Correspondent,
Office of New Jersey State Senator Raymond Zane (Oct. 20, 2000).
124. See A.B. 3441.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. A reasonable person would not expect to be observed or videotaped while in
their own home or apartment, as it is considered to be a “private place.”  Cf.
Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. 1997) (stressing that homes are
private places, the sanctity of which should be protected).
128. A reasonable person generally would expect to be “free from surveillance”
when in a retail dressing room with the door closed.  See People v. Abate, 306 N.W.2d
476, 479 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (indicating that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a changing booth).  But see Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,
339 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a retail customer did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when signs were posted informing
customers that the fitting room was under security surveillance).
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Yet, this bill, like the Missouri statute, fails to address expressly the
nature and scope of the privacy invasion that it seeks to prohibit.  It
will not deter a stranger from aiming a video camera directly
underneath an individual’s skirt or baggy shorts, or down an
individual’s shirt or blouse while in the public space.129  It will provide
no protection for a patron who waits in line at an amusement park
concession stand,130 for a sales clerk assisting a would-be customer in a
retail store,131 or for a commuter who rides the subway during rush
hour.132  Yet, these intrusions are no less demeaning, humiliating, or
invasive than if any unsuspecting consumer was secretly filmed while
trying on a pair of pants in a retail dressing room.133
C. Case Study:  Connecticut
In late 1998, a similar incident of video voyeurism inflamed the
residents of the state of Connecticut.134  John Humphreville, an
enterprising sixteen-year-old, was arrested after he secretly
                                                                
129. See supra text accompanying note 125 (explaining that the pending bill would
apply to using and installing equipment only in private places and not in public
places).  This is precisely why the California legislature realized that their existing
statute, which is very similar to the New Jersey bill, is inadequate.  See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647(k) (West 1994) (affirmatively providing protection of private places, but
silent on protection in public settings).  Thus, the California legislature recently
enacted a new law that affirmatively creates an expectation of privacy in public
settings.  See discussion infra Part IV.A (describing the promulgation of an
amendment to the California Penal Code).
130. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Proposal Seeks End to “Cyber Peeping”:  It May Be Bad, But
It Isn’t Illegal Yet, SAN D IEGO UNION-TRIB., July 9, 1998, at A3 (discussing several
instances of public invasions of privacy that occurred in California).
131. See Lisa Sink & Linda Spice, Man Accused of Videotaping Under Skirts,
MILWAUKEE J. SENT. (Milwaukee, Wis.), July 11, 1998, at 1 (reporting the story of a
man who secretly aimed a hidden video camera underneath the skirts of several
seated female store clerks by concealing a camcorder in a backpack in which he had
cut a special hole designed to expose the lens).  The article reports that upon
inspection of the man’s house, police discovered evidence relating to at least 35
different Internet sites devoted to video voyeurism.  See id.  With titles, such as “Skip’s
Voyeur Pictures” and “Upskirts Pictures,” several of these sites instructed viewers how
to conceal cameras hidden within gym bags, water bottles and pagers in order to spy
on others.  See id.
132. This example of video voyeurism also takes place in a public setting, where
no reasonable expectation of privacy attaches and, therefore, the New Jersey bill
would not prohibit such an occurrence.  See A.B. 3411, 208th Legis. Sess. (N.J. 1999)
(offering protection only in settings where a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
133. If these video images are disseminated across the Internet, the victim’s
privacy is subject to countless and repeated violations.  Furthermore, if the victim’s
likeness is, in fact, identifiable from the video, then the potential for significant
mental anguish is magnified dramatically.  Yet, when the incident occurs in a public
space, in contrast to a private space, the victim would have no recourse at all under
this bill.
134. See Janice D’Arcy, Teen Named in Warrant in Cheshire Voyeur Case, HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 8, 1999, at A3 (noting that a Connecticut teenager videotaped four of
his female classmates while changing clothes at two pool parties).
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videotaped several of his female classmates as they changed into
swimsuits at a high school pool party.135  Subsequently, Humphreville
displayed and distributed several copies of the illicit video to his male
classmates.136  Despite the highly invasive nature of his actions,
prosecutors were only able to charge this student with three counts of
breach of the peace.137
In league with the Missouri statute and the debated New Jersey bill,
the Connecticut legislature responded by passing a video voyeurism
statute of its own.138  The Connecticut law prohibits any person from
recording the image of another person, “while such other person is
not in plain view, and . . . under circumstances where such other
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” when the recording
is made knowingly, without consent, and for lascivious purposes.139  By
its own terms, the statute explicitly excludes public settings.140
Therefore, it denies an individual, under any circumstances, a
legitimate expectation of privacy while not specifically behind
something equivalent to closed doors.
D. Bodies in Motion:  Re-Conceptualizing Public and Private Space
The three legislative attempts to combat video voyeurism discussed
above represent the necessary and initial step of acknowledging video
invasions of privacy as a legally cognizable injury under criminal law.
In a very real sense, however, all three laws are inadequate to address
                                                                
135. See id. (stating that the defendant, with the help of a teenage friend, “tricked”
the victims into changing in front of hidden cameras).
136. See id. (reporting that Humphreville’s accomplice will likely escape charges,
because unlike Humphreville, he did not participate in playing or duplicating the
videotapes which constituted the actual basis of the charge of breach of the peace).
137. See id. (noting that in addition to the criminal charges filed against
Humphreville, both students were suspended from school).  The article further
reports that the school provided the victims with counseling, because they were so
upset by the incident.  See id.
138. See An Act Concerning Voyeurism, 1999 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-143 (S.S.B.
1078) (West) (addressing voyeurism); see also Stephen Ohlemacher, Senate Approves
Legislation to Punish Video Voyeurs, HARTFORD COURANT, May 21, 1999, at A3
(describing two other incidents of voyeurism in Connecticut, which further
prompted passage of the new legislation).  An 18-year-old female resident of New
Haven testified at a public hearing that she had been videotaped through her
bedroom window by a fellow student.  See id.  Additionally, a 21-year-old male was
charged with disorderly conduct for videotaping a female college student as she
showered in her college dormitory at the University of Connecticut.  See id.
139. See An Act Concerning Voyeurism, 1999 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West)
(stipulating that enforcement of the statute not only is contingent upon a
determination of the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, but that the
statute further mandates that the person protected specifically not be “in plain
view”).
140. See id. (explaining that a person has committed voyeurism when he
videotapes someone not in “plain view,” and only when the individual taped has a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
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the crime of video voyeurism.  The inadequacy is rooted in the way
the law divides space into private and public141 and apportions
reasonable expectations of privacy such that the expectation of
privacy exists in the former, but not the latter.142
This delineation is grounded in the following flawed but seemingly
canonical tort principle:  “[o]n the public street, or in any other
public place, the plaintiff has no legal right to be alone.”143
Accordingly, courts have upheld a photographer’s right to
photograph another in a public place, regardless of consent.144  The
law, it seems, simply ignores the reality that some expectations of
privacy remain reasonable even when they are held while in the
public domain.
The failure of both criminal and civil law to recognize a legitimate
expectation of privacy in public settings, however, results from more
                                                                
141. See supra notes 109, 124, 138 and accompanying text (highlighting statutory
language that specifically excludes enforceability of the crime when the intrusion
occurs in the public space).
142. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
seemingly irrelevant distinction between expectations of privacy in private versus
public places).  Professor McClurg has argued:
[P]rivacy is not an all or nothing concept.  While a person necessarily
surrenders a great deal of privacy when she ventures from a place of physical
solitude into the light of public view, it does not follow that she forfeits all
legitimate expectations of privacy . . . .  [T]here are important components
of privacy that have nothing to do with physical solitude.  When these
components are invaded in a highly offensive manner, even in a public
place, tort law, [as well as criminal law], should recognize a remedy.
McClurg, supra note 48, at 1044.
143. Prosser, supra note 29, at 391; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his
photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in
seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye.”).  The narrow
exceptions to this rule have failed to provide an adequate framework to support a
legally cognizable violation of tort privacy in the public space.  See supra Part II.C
(discussing the failure of tort law to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy
despite some authority to the contrary).
144. See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D. Me. 1987)
(stating that a passenger on a cruise ship did not have a valid cause of action despite
the fact that the photographer had harassed her, because the photographs were
taken in public areas open to all passengers); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co.,
79 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (D. Minn. 1948) (holding that a photographer did not
invade the privacy of a litigant by taking his picture against his wishes while in the
courtroom); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963) (concluding that a
private detective who was hired by an insurer to investigate personal injury claims
relating to an automobile accident did not invade plaintiff’s privacy by filming the
plaintiff while on public thoroughfares).  The Forster court stated that because the
plaintiff had exposed herself to public observation, she could not expect the same
degree of privacy as would be expected within her own home.  Id.  Cf. United States
v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897, 898 (E.D. Ky. 1954) (“The operation of a camera is a
lawful act and a citizen’s privilege to take pictures, unless made specifically unlawful
by statute, is such a civil right as is protected by the Constitution of the United
States.”).
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than just an inadequate understanding of public and private space.
Exacerbating this dilemma is the insistence, embodied in the law of
privacy, that the act of observing an individual with the unaided eye is
indistinguishable from the act of making a permanent written or
photographic record of the same.145  If this rationale was ever at one
time accurate—a dubious proposition—then today’s surveillance
technology, particularly when used surreptitiously and with
voyeuristic intent, has made this distinction not only obsolete, but
preposterous.146
Video voyeurism is a crime engineered to strip its victims of privacy.
It creates a permanent record memorializing the intrusion and
facilitating repeated dissemination to a practically unlimited Internet
audience.147  Most importantly, its victims are not safe behind the
sanctity of an enclosure nor underneath the protection traditionally
afforded by clothing.148
                                                                
145. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 391-92 (asserting that photographing an
individual in public is not an invasion of privacy “since this amounts to nothing more
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written description, of a
public sight which any one present would be free to see”).  Prosser relied on Gill v.
Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Cal. 1953), which held that a man and woman
who were embracing while sitting on a public bench did not have an actionable claim
for invasion of privacy when their photograph was taken and subsequently published
as an advertisement.  See Prosser, supra note 29, at 405-06 (“[I]t has been held that
the mere incidental mention of the plaintiff’s name in a . . . commentary upon news
which is part of an advertisement, is not an invasion of his privacy; nor is the
publication of a photograph . . . in which he . . . appears.”) (emphasis added).  But see
Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs:  Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75 TEX. L. REV.
779, 790 (1997) (“The photograph, moreover, although not quite identical to a
picture’s subject, nevertheless seems to correspond to the subject in a way that words,
which signify through the arbitrary conventions of language, do not.”); McClurg,
supra note 48, at 1040-41 (arguing that treating privacy as “an all or nothing concept
is too rigid”).  McClurg states:
Privacy is a matter of degree.  Although persons surrender much privacy
when they venture to a public place, it does not follow that they
automatically forfeit all privacy.  There is a difference, which the law should
recognize, between being ‘seen’ in public and being closely scrutinized
or . . . recorded on film or videotape.
McClurg, supra note 48, at 1040-41.
146. See Burrows, supra note 1, at 1129 (arguing that the law should recognize the
difference between being seen by someone and producing a permanent record
through photography).  Burrows further states that videotaping is more egregious
than photography because “much of the person’s personality is captured by the
tape.”  Id.  Pointedly, Burrows continues, “[s]imply because a woman is wearing a
skirt and prefers not to wear underwear in public does not give a videographer or
surveillance technician the right to capture and exploit her image.” Id. (citations
omitted).
147. Cf. McClurg, supra note 48, at 1041-43 (detailing three specific differences
between the unaided observation and the photographic intrusion:  (1) the creation
of a permanent record, (2) the conveyance of information otherwise not noticeable
by transitory observations, and (3) a potential exaggeration of the impact of the
intrusion through wide dissemination).
148. See Letter from Matthew Eaton, supra note 12 and accompanying text
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Accordingly, lawmakers must develop a new jurisprudential
understanding of the privacy interest inherent in the human body in
order to deal effectively with video voyeurism.  Rather than viewing
bodies as discrete particles moving from public to private spaces, the
law must recognize that the surface of the body is, itself, a private
space.149  In fact, the body is the locus of our most powerful
expectation of privacy.  The ability to determine when, to what
degree, to whom, and under what circumstances the body is exposed,
as argued above, is among the most fundamental aspects of the right
to privacy and deeply tied to the concept of human dignity.150
Therefore, in response to the crime of video voyeurism, the law must
expressly reject the prevailing understanding of privacy as overly
constrictive and inadequate.  In its place, the law must recognize a
limited, but fundamentally reasonable, expectation of privacy that is
sensitive to an individual’s desire to control exposure to both
intimate acts and intimate body parts regardless of setting.
IV. RECOGNITION OF A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
PUBLIC:  ACKNOWLEDGING AN ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN
PRIVACY WITHIN THE DIGITAL AGE
At least two states, California and Louisiana, have confronted the
issue of video voyeurism head-on and have expanded some modicum
of legal protection to the public space.  These two states deserve
                                                                
(providing an example of video voyeurism occurring in a public shopping mall
where none of the 18 different victims realized that they had been filmed).  The
Montclair Police Department’s experience with perpetrators who use hidden
cameras to film underneath the skirts of female shoppers clearly indicates that the
legal right to privacy should not depend upon the distinction between public and
private space.  See id. (detailing examples of surreptitious videotaping deemed
inactionable because they took place in the public setting of a mall).  Such a
distinction is not only facially arbitrary, but it patently confuses both the harm caused
by the intrusion of video voyeurism as well as the nature of the right of privacy that
this rule purports to serve.  See Morton, supra note 37, at 1444 (explaining that there
are no adequate legal remedies to protect against intrusive acts of voyeurism when
the subject is located in plain view or a public space, and tort law generally
incorrectly assumes that an individual in public consents to being photographed).
Had these shoppers been surreptitiously filmed while changing clothing behind the
closed doors of a retail dressing room, their injury would be identical, but their claim
suddenly would be actionable.  See supra Part III.A-C (discussing three recent laws
that would prohibit video voyeurism in dressing rooms but not in the public space).
149. Cf. McClurg, supra note 48, at 1040-41 (arguing that a person does not forfeit
all privacy when in public); Malkan, supra note 145, at 779 (“The right of privacy,
which protects personality from unwanted public exposure, presumes that an
individual possesses a deeper identity, distinct from his or her socially defined
personality.”).
150. See Bloustein, supra note 39 and accompanying text (suggesting that human
dignity is fundamentally linked to an individual’s right to be free from certain types
of intrusions).
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credit for taking steps to “re-think” the ancient right of privacy in
accordance with the principle of an individual’s “inviolate
personality,”151 particularly when juxtaposed against the technological
challenges of our electronic age.
A. Case Study:  California
In 1998, the people of Orange County, California witnessed a rash
of three separate incidents of video voyeurism within a single
month.152  Although California already criminalized the use of hidden
cameras to invade surreptitiously the privacy of another in any
enclosed area that provides a reasonable expectation of privacy,153 all
three incidents proved to be immune from criminal prosecution.154
The reason:  they all occurred in public settings.155
To the unease of residents and tourists alike, these particular video
voyeurs trained their camera lenses on unsuspecting individuals
visiting the beach, enjoying a Memorial Day festival, and touring
Disneyland.156  In one case, confiscated tapes revealed the perpetrator
followed several dozen women for up to ten minutes while he
attempted to position a gym bag containing a hidden camera directly
between the women’s legs as they waited in lines or shopped in
crowded stores.157  To no avail, prosecutors combed the California
Penal Code for more than a week attempting to find any law that was
violated.158
                                                                
151. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205 (discussing privacy as premised
upon an inviolate personality).
152. See Rams, supra note 80, at A1 (discussing the growing trend of video
voyeurism within public settings in California). “Men armed with video cameras are
secretly filming up women’s skirts and down their blouses in growing numbers, and
police say they can’t do anything about it.”  Id.
153. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting
some invasions of privacy as disorderly conduct).  The statute prohibits:
Any person who looks through a hole or opening, into, or otherwise views,
by means of any instrumentality . . . the interior of a bathroom, changing
room . . . or the interior of any other area in which the occupant has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of a person or
persons inside.
Id. (emphasis added).
154. See Rams, supra note 80, at A1 (quoting a police official as stating, “We would
have liked to charge [them] with a crime, but there was nothing we could do”).
155. See id. (“It is a crime to illegally tape in restrooms, changing rooms or tanning
salons.  Anywhere there is an expectation of privacy.  But not in public.”).
156. See id. (reporting three taping incidents, including one perpetrator who
filmed down multiple women’s shirts as they exited carnival rides during the Garden
Grove Memorial Day festival).
157. See id. (quoting the investigatng officer as stating, “[n]o one should have to
feel that they need to be careful because someone might stick a camera up her
dress”).
158. See id. (“The filming is not a battery because nobody was touched.  Or
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In response to these incidents, the California legislature undertook
to amend and update the existing ban on video voyeurism in private
enclosures.159  The new statute criminalizes the secret, non-consensual
filming “under or through the clothing”160 of another identifiable
person for the purposes of sexual gratification, provided the
circumstances were such that the victim formed a reasonable
expectation of privacy.161  As described in its legislative history, the
statute is designed “to apply to the sexually motivated invasion of
another’s privacy through [a video] device.”162
Unlike the statutes discussed thus far,163 this legislation premises
the protection of individual privacy on the invasion committed,
rather than on the location where that invasion occurred.164  By
prohibiting the act of recording “under or through the clothing” of
the victim, the statute underscores that such a privacy violation may
occur in either the public or private space.165  In other words, this
statute abandons the traditional distinctions between public and
                                                                
eavesdropping.  Or aiding and abetting an indecent exposure.”).  An Anaheim
police officer stated, “This man should be in jail.  We’ve done everything we could to
put him there.  But we can’t come up with anything.”  Id.
159. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (establishing
criminal protection of privacy in public spaces under limited circumstances).  The
statute prohibits:
Any person who uses a concealed camcorder . . . or photographic camera of
any type, to secretly videotape . . . or record by electronic means, another,
identifiable person under or through the clothing being worn by that other
person, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn
by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that other
person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions, or
sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of that other person,
under circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
Id.; see Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (detailing the purposes behind the
amendment).  See generally Nancy Hill-Holtzman, New Law Takes Aim at Video
Voyeurism, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at A3 (reporting that the governor of California
signed the bill into law on August 26, 1999); Daniel M. Weintraub, Bill Banning Video-
Peeping Passes Legislature Assembly, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Aug. 17, 1999, at 1
(reporting that the state Assembly passed the legislation by a vote of 64-0).
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2).
161. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (requiring that the circumstances be such
that entitle the victim to a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Hearing on A.B.
182, supra note 116 (stating that California statute is narrowly drafted to prohibit the
purposeful invasion of privacy of the victim but not to infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of the voyeur).
162. Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116.
163. See supra Part III (discussing several recent video voyeurism statutes that fail
to provide protection in the public space).
164. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (stating that it is unlawful to
“electronically record—under or through the clothing—the intimate body parts or
clothing of another”).
165. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (“The conduct prohibited by this bill
would occur in a public place where the defendant would have a right to be.
Further, one generally has a right to take photographs in a public place.”).
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private space and, instead, harmonizes both the nature of the right to
privacy entitled to protection and the scope of the privacy invasion
affected by the video voyeur.166
Reminiscent of the notion of an individual’s inviolate personality,
the California statute preserves the right of privacy irrespective of
outdated conceptions of space and in step with the march of
technology.167  The scope of protection afforded by the statute,
however, will likely remain an issue due to several technical
limitations.  First, the statute appears to require that the victim be
identifiable.168  This poses a significant question as to the effectiveness
of the statute, because often there is no way to identify individual
victims from images of their undergarments or lack-there-of.169
Second, the statute continues to employ the problematic language a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”170  This language is burdened
with vestiges of the outmoded distinction between public and private
space and is likely to generate ambiguity.171  Rather, the statute would
                                                                
166. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (“This bill narrowly defines the privacy
interest as the right to be free from surreptitious visual recording for purposes of
sexual gratification.”).
167. See Hill-Holtzman, supra note 159, at A3 (quoting Governor Davis’ Press
Secretary as stating:  “The bill addresses the need to punish a despicable act of
behavior:  filming innocent women without their knowledge in a lewd manner.  It is
necessary that we protect the privacy of those targeted individuals”).
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting the
filming of another, “identifiable person”).  But see Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116
(discussing the potential for ambiguity over the issue of whether the victim need be
identifiable).  The committee notes read:
The language of the bill may not clearly state whether or not the victim must
be identifiable from the prohibited image to allow conviction under the new
crime.  However, it appears from the background information that the intent
of the author of the bill is that the law could be applied in cases where there
is no identifiable victim.
Id.
169. The difficulties with requiring that the victim be identifiable are twofold.
First, as discussed throughout this Comment, many victims do not know that they
have been victimized, and, therefore, will not press charges or contact the police.  See
Tutaj, supra note 55, at 665 (stating that potential civil plaintiffs often are unaware
that they have been videotaped and never file suit).  Second, many of these
voyeuristic pictures do not reveal the victims’ faces, and, therefore, it is often difficult
to identify a specific victim from a specific video.  See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note
116 (“Thus, the bill raises the issue of whether a defendant can be found guilty of
criminal violation of privacy where it cannot be determined whose privacy was
invaded.”).
170. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (requiring “circumstances in which the
[victim] has a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
171. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (addressing issues likely to arise
including whether the victim was videotaped or photographed while in a state of
exposure that was already within public view of the unaided eye, such as when a
woman wears a short skirt and her undergarments are observable without any
extraordinary effort).  The committee notes indicate, “the issue of whether an
alleged ‘up-skirt’ victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy where her
undergarments could be observed by the naked eye and during normal activity
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likely be more effective if it abandoned this language and instead,
premised culpability upon a bad-faith intent standard.172  Last, this
statute does not address the dissemination of these videos onto the
Internet.173  Although this statute is a clear step forward,174 it may cast
a smaller net than is necessary in order to combat the harm inflicted
by the crime of video voyeurism.175
B. Case Study:  Louisiana
In 1998, the state of Louisiana discovered that it too was not
immune from video voyeurism.176  Two neighboring families traded
keys in order to watch each other’s houses, water the plants, and
gather mail when one of them was away.177  This typical suburban
arrangement came to a shocking close, however, when one family
discovered that its neighbor, a local church deacon, secretly had
installed hidden video equipment in the attic above its bedrooms and
bathrooms.178
                                                                
would likely arise often in court.”  Id.
172. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Louisiana video voyeurism statute, which
does not include a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, but instead
premises culpability upon a lack of consent and a lewd intent).  Cf. Hearing on A.B.
182, supra note 116 (pointing out another possible weakness in the California statute
regarding the intent requirement).  The legislative history states:
This bill requires that a defendant have surreptitiously visually recorded the
underclothing or body of another for purposes of sexual gratification.  Thus,
a person who operates an Internet ‘up-skirts’ site for commercial purposes, and
not for sexual gratification, would not be subject to prosecution under this bill.
Id. (emphasis added).
173. See Margaret Kane, California Bans Video Peeping, ZDNET NEWS, Aug. 27, 1999,
at 1 (reporting that the new law does not address Internet distribution, despite the
fact that there are “dozens of Web sites that specialize in displaying such videos”).
The California statute does not address the issue of dissemination of these videos
once they are recorded.  See id. (expressing an opinion that there is not much one
can do about distribution of videos, but one can strip the source).  Publication of
these pictures on the Internet is the second half of the crime of video voyeurism that
must be addressed.  See id. (stating that “videopeeping” is a new forum of video
voyeurism).
174. See Ainsworth, supra note 130, at A3 (quoting the bill’s sponsors as
proclaiming that “[t]his is common-sense legislation to protect women from cyber
predators and to assure their likeness is not used in a way contrary to their wishes”).
175. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 116 (noting that prosecution may prove
difficult under the new crime).
176. See Randy McClain, Lawmaker Proposes Video-Voyeurism Law, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., Nov. 27, 1998, at 13B (reporting on proposed video voyeurism legislation
that would prohibit video voyeurism when the victim has not consented and the
taping is committed with a lewd intent).
177. See Joanna Weiss, Voyeur Prompts DA to Propose Peeping Tom Law, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 10, 1999, at A1 (describing the relationship between the two
neighbors as friendly before the video incidents occurred).
178. See id. (reporting that the neighbor drilled holes in the ceilings of the master
bedroom and bathroom as well as the teenage daughter’s bathroom and installed a
video camera and television monitor hidden underneath the attic insulation).  The
article further reports that the victims initially paid no attention to the small holes in
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Unfortunately for the victims, the Louisiana Penal Code did not
specifically criminalize video voyeurism.179  Thus, the church deacon
eventually entered a plea of unlawful entry, and currently is serving
only three years of probation.180  After months of vigorous debate
within the legislature,181 Louisiana recently passed a statute that
directly addresses the intrusive nature of video voyeurism.182  The
statute prohibits, “[t]he use of a camera . . . or any other image
recording device for the purpose of observing, viewing,
photographing, filming or videotaping a person where that person
has not consented to the observing . . . or videotaping and it is for a
lewd or lascivious purpose.”183
In other words, the new law protects individual privacy in both
enclosed and public settings.184  It does not rely on the vague test of
the reasonable expectations of the victim, and instead focuses directly
on the unreasonable and offensive nature of the conduct committed
by the video voyeur.185  Furthermore, the statute also prohibits the
dissemination of voyeuristic images by “live or recorded telephone
message, electronic mail, the Internet, or a commercial online
service.”186  The Louisiana statute represents a delicate compromise
                                                                
the ceiling and assumed that the previous homeowner had hung decorative baskets.
See id. (“You never think, ‘Oh, I’ll bet somebody has a surveillance camera.’  You
think, ‘Oh, our house is falling apart.’”).
179. See id.  (“Entering her house was illegal.  Using her electricity was illegal.
Damaging her property was illegal.  Videotaping her was not.”).
180. See id. (reporting that the defendant’s prison term was suspended, and he is
now serving three years of probation after paying restitution of $2,000); see also Ed
Anderson, House OKs Ban on Video Voyeurs, NEW ORLEANS T IMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 10,
1999, at A1 (contrasting the lenient sentence with the fact that the primary victim,
Susan Wilson, now suffers from an eating disorder, fears taking a bath with the lights
on and sometimes bathes with her clothes on).
181. See Marsha Shuler, Video Voyeurism Measure Has House, Senate at Odds, BATON
ROUGE ADVOC., Apr. 14, 1999, at 6A (“The dispute is over just how much protection
an individual should have from secret videotaping in their home or anywhere else
privacy is expected.”).
182. See 1999 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 14:283(A)(1) (West) (codified at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 283 (West Supp. 2000)) (addressing video voyeurism).
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 283(A)(1).
184. See id. (prohibiting video voyeurism in such a manner that the location of the
intrusion is not an element of the crime); Telephone Interview with Rep. Willie
Hunter (D-Monroe, La.), sponsor of H.B. 67 (July 29, 1999) [hereinafter Hunter
Interview] (confirming that this legislation creates an affirmative expectation of
privacy in the public space in order to protect against video voyeurism so long as it is
committed with a lewd and lascivious intent).
185. See Hunter Interview, supra note 184 (revealing that the legislators eventually
removed the “reasonable expectation of privacy” language because it could create a
loophole which could frustrate the intent of the legislation as well as potentially
cause difficulties for legitimate instances of surreptitious video recording such as
police investigations).
186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 283(A)(2); see also Weiss, supra note 177, at A1
(reporting that the perpetrator learned of the idea to videotape his neighbor from
the Internet).  Weiss also highlights the timeliness of the Louisiana statute, which
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between the legitimate concerns that the new statute would be overly
broad and the equally legitimate interest in deterring and punishing
conduct that ought to be criminal.187
In contrast to the prevailing criminal protection of privacy rights,188
this legislation addresses, recognizes and affirms the right of an
individual to control the ability of others to observe and preserve
images of intimate moments, intimate acts, and intimate body parts,
regardless of arbitrary distinctions between public and private
space.189  A voyeur who seeks to videotape under or through the
clothing of an unsuspecting and non-consenting victim, whether
behind closed doors or while riding an escalator in the local
shopping mall, will fall within the scope of this law.190
In prosecutions under the Louisiana statute, however, questions
will still remain as to whether the requisite lewd or lascivious intent
can be proven or whether the victim, through some conduct, can be
found to have implicitly consented to the recording.191  Despite this
                                                                
prohibits the transfer of images obtained by video voyeurism over the Internet.  See
id.  However, the statute is narrowly drafted not to prohibit the legitimate activities in
image transmission of businesses such as phone and cable companies and Internet
services providers.  See LA . REV. STAT. ANN. § 283(C) (providing that the provisions of
Section 283 prohibiting the transfer of video voyeurism images do not apply to
legitimate business).
187. See Randy McClain, Changes Could Kill Video-Voyeurism Bill, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., June 9, 1999, at 6A (quoting a lobbyist for the Louisiana District Attorneys
Association as stating that “[i]t’s hard to envision how courts will rule on where
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy”); see also Ed Anderson, Video-Voyeur
Measure Sets Criminal Penalties, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 22, 1999, at A6
(reporting that different versions of the bill included certain exceptions that would
have allowed video monitoring of prisoners as well as video monitoring of individuals
during pending civil and worker’s compensation suits, but that legislators could not
find a workable bill that included the “reasonable expectation” language while
adequately including sufficient exceptions so as not to interfere with legitimate
instances of video monitoring).  The article reported:
The House and Senate never could agree on which exceptions to keep and
which ones to delete from the bill, so [the sponsor] asked the conference
committee to rewrite the bill to make it apply to anyone who tapes another
without the person’s knowledge and for ‘lewd and lascivious reasons.’
Anderson, supra, at A6.
188. See supra Part III (criticizing the majority of jurisdictions criminal protection
of privacy by referencing three recent video voyeurism laws).
189. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 283(A)(1), (B) (defining and prohibiting video
voyeurism regardless of whether the violation occurs in public or in private places,
but, instead, predicating the application of the statute on whether the observed or
taped person has consented to the taping, and on the intent of the perpetrator).
190. See Hunter Interview, supra note 184 (confirming that this legislation was
intended to prevent all forms of surreptitious video voyeurism, provided that it was
committed with the requisite lewd intent and therefore lacks any legitimate
countervailing interest).
191. See id. (“You can’t write a perfect bill, but you can write a bill that becomes a
law that can curb these types of activities.  Besides, the bill can be amended.  That is
the legislative process.”).
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imprecision, the statute expressly recognizes that the right of privacy,
and the fundamental dignity associated with the ability to control the
exposure of one’s body, is not so ephemeral a right as to be
reasonably expected when in the house, but not in the backyard.
Rather, the Louisiana statute provides victims with a legitimate
opportunity for redress where there was none, and provides a forum
to litigate these issues where previously there was only frustration and
silence.
CONCLUSION
Even within a world so consumed by voyeuristic tendencies,192
depictions of the modern day Peeping Tom are somehow innately
disturbing to the sensibilities.  Nevertheless, video voyeurism has thus
far proven to be a lucrative pursuit for anyone inclined to engage in
this shameful trade of privacy invasion.  Law, and in particular
criminal law, must expressly undertake to protect the privacy rights of
individuals.  This protection requires a re-conceptualization of public
and private space as well as an abandonment of the prevailing, but
flawed, understanding of human privacy that currently underpins the
majority of jurisdictions’ attempts to criminalize video voyeurism.193
Only when new laws recognize the right to protect the human body
from unreasonable and obscene intrusion by video technology,
regardless of location, forum and space, will individual privacy be
adequately protected from the crime of video voyeurism.  Therefore,
all of the remaining states would do well to follow in the footsteps of
both California and Louisiana.  Yet, it should remain the task of all
lawmakers to continue to refine the delicate interaction between law,
technology and the fundamental rights we enjoy as humans.
Ultimately, the law must recognize the body, itself, as a kind of private
space, the most private space that a human being will ever inhabit.
                                                                
192. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Video Links Bears, Cubs to Fans, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 10,
1999, at 30 (reporting the use of a hidden camera to bring live video feed of bears in
the wild at a state park to the Internet); Patrick O’Driscoll, At Columbine High,
Deterrent Factors Await, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 1999, at 4A (reporting the installation of
16 new surveillance cameras in Colombine High School); Alan Sipress, ‘Big Brother’
Could Soon Ride Along in Back Seat, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at A1 (discussing plans
to implement hidden cameras at traffic intersections to capture images of drivers
running red lights); John Thor-Dahlburg, Sobering News at Jim Morrison’s Grave, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A2 (reporting on the use of hidden surveillance cameras to
monitor and control crowds gathering at the famous singer’s gravesite); CBS The
Early Show (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 5, 2000) (reporting the use of hidden
cameras by journalists to investigate the recent Ford-Firestone defective sport utility
vehicle tire story).
193. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text (tracing the meaning of privacy
and explaining differences in the concepts surrounding privacy).
